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This empirical study explores the general effects of military installations on 
local employment, and the special case of closure under the Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) proceedings of 1 988, 1 991 , 1 993, and 1 995 . Employment 
impacts are modeled in a partial adjustment construct, and both random and 
fixed effects specifications of the disturbance term are evaluated. The analysis 
a lso includes both levels and changes forms of the model. The latter approach 
facil itates decomposition of defense personnel changes into its positive, 
negative, and BRAC related components. These components are examined for 
asymmetrical effects attributable to the public goods and community 
infrastructure vacuum that is created when military instal lations draw down. The 
specific effects of economic assistance, and facilities conversion and reutilization 
in BRAC communities are also considered, as are the elasticities of defense 
employment multipl iers with respect to regional industry specialization and 
military vs. civil ian workforce composition.  Two-stage least squares instrumental 
variable techniques are employed to a lleviate concerns over the relationship 
between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbances . 
A novel panel data set incorporating 21 years of military and private 
industry observations for 963 mil itary installations and 3,092 counties a llows 
comprehensive modeling and examination of defense related employment trends 
across a ll 50 states. The collection of sub-county defense personnel figures 
addresses a shortcoming of other county-level impact studies, which reconcile 
v 
community employment changes against base closure personnel losses, without 
consideration of personnel dynamics at other military installations within the 
same county. 
The study finds evidence of an asymmetrical relationship between military 
personnel level changes, and local community employment. While this supports 
the proposition of favorable effects through reutilization of public and community 
infrastructure, facilities, and housing when bases draw down, economic 
assistance and the practice of outsourcing defense support functions are also 
identified as contributors to this condition. Results of the study also suggest the 
degree to which regional industry special ization and workforce composition 
influence the effect of loca l defense employment on community employment is 
minimal .  The exception is the reutil ization effects of BRAC related personnel 
losses, which appear to be less favorable in counties with a strong mil itary 
presence. 
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"Because the Congress remains concerned about the local economic 
effects of closing bases, it could request further study of that phenomenon 
in order to provide an empirical perspective from which to consider 
additional base closings." 
- CBO, Closing Military Bases: An Interim Assessment, 1 996 
Despite an estimated facilities reduction of 20 percent, or 464,000 acres 
between the 1 988, '91 , '93 and '95 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
rounds, the Department of Defense (DoD) continues to press for additional 
infrastructure cuts (GAO, 1 998) . The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
Defense Reform Initiative, and National Defense Panel al l conclude aggregate 
military base capacity exceeds requirements of the strategy and force structure 
laid out under QDR (OSD, 1 998) . Even the Congressional Budget Office notes a 
disparity between existing troop levels and support structure capacity. 
Specifical ly, they identified an unexplainable per capita facility square footage 
increase of 33% from 1 988 to 1 997, despite already completed base closure and 
reutilization actions (CBO, 1 996) . 
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In  its 1 998 report to Congress, the Pentagon requested two more closure 
rounds, detail ing additional installation excess capacity of 23 percent, along with 
compell ing support for cutting this deadweight. In particular, readiness, 
modernization, and quality of life were identified as areas compromised by 
spreading budgets over unneeded facilities (OSD, 1 998) . Two years later, the 
call for more BRAC rounds has gone unheeded. Concern over the regional 
economic impact of BRAC is a likely roadblock to congressiona l  authorization of 
additional closures. Given the DoD's estimate of 236,000 direct jobs and 
1 20,000 indirect jobs permanently lost under the first four rounds, the implied job 
loss multiplier of 1 .51 is probably at the heart of this concern. But any such 
closure aversion is only as defensible as the impact estimates themselves. Post­
closure studies suggest related impact estimates were exaggerated . A lack of 
empirical analysis of mil itary base employment effects is probably the cause for 
this exaggeration.  Without the benefit of econometrical ly derived multipl iers, 
impact estimates were based on less precise methods, such as expert opinion 
and modified economic base and input-output techniques. A subsequent 
discussion of economic base and input-output frameworks i l lustrates that when 
either of these approaches is adapted to the mil itary base setting, the underlying 
assumptions often result in upward biased estimates. 
Research Objectives 
Under the four BRAC rounds completed thus far, both local and DoD pro 
forma projections of economic consequences to the local communities painted 
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bleak, if not d isastrous pictures. In fact, qual itative studies indicate actual results 
overal l were generally quite mild. Understandably, grassroots lobbying efforts 
may have influenced some of the inflated forecasts. To some degree local 
authorities and congressional representatives have incentives to make "their'' 
bases appear as the worst choice for closure relative to other bases under 
consideration . But that aside, for reasons to be discussed, even objectively 
derived military base impact multipliers are generally biased upward and do not 
provide for the possibility of asymmetrical private employment effects. In short, 
current tools and practices artificially boost the cost side of benefit-cost studies 
related to realignment and closure deliberations. Given recent political 
resistance to the Secretary of Defense's seemingly wel l  founded requests for 
additional closure rounds, impartial and defensible empirical models that reflect 
the regional economic consequences of closure are much needed. This study 
developed around that need. 
The objective of the proposed study is an employment impact analysis of 
military base labor forces on local stateside communities in genera l, and more 
specifically the impact of base closures resulting from the 1 988, '91 , '93 and '95 
closure rounds. Of course the product of this ana lysis will be empirical ly derived 
military base employment multipliers. Within the scope of this research, the 
propositions outlined below will be examined . 
3 
Propositions 
The following research propositions relate to the defense personnel and 
base closure impact variables of interest in this study. Specifically, they address 
the county level impact of military base employment in general ;  the potential 
offsetting effects of facility reutilization; and local industry and population 
characteristics that influence the degree of mil itary employment impacts. In a l l  
cases, the anticipated effect is on local private industry employment. 
Proposition (1): Increases in mil itary base labor force levels spur 
demand driven positive indirect employment effects in the surrounding 
communities.1 This baseline relationship  h inges on two characteristics of military 
installations. First, though much of an instal lation's support is organic, generally 
it is not completely self-sufficient. Bases typically host a variety of contracted 
services such as dining hall operations, construction, general facil ity 
maintenance, and repairs. Regardless of where contracts are let, administered, 
or paid, the contractors' onsite staffs are an increase in local employment and a 
direct result of the bases' operations. Secondly, since military and federal civil ian 
employees often come from outside counties, they represent a boost in local 
wage earners; and those with income consume, however modest their margina l 
propensity to do so. Even the thriftiest must still satisfy the bare necessities of 
1 With the exception of discussions related to Input-Output modeling, the terms "indirect 
employment effects" and "indirect effects" are used loosely throughout this study to mean indirect 
and induced effects combined. 
4 
food and shelter locally. This boost in local consumption generally translates to 
additional, or induced local employment. 
Proposition (2): Decreases in base employment generally exert positive 
indirect employment effects. I n  other words, defense personnel downsizing -
whether it be BRAC related or routine - represents 'Job creation through job 
destruction" opportunities for local communities. Specifica lly, while the overall 
employment impact (i .e., d irect plus indirect jobs) may be negative, supply side 
factors related to freed labor and private infrastructure (e.g . ,  developed 
residential communities and industrial facilities) result in asymmetrical, or positive 
net indirect effects. Expanded discussion of these factors and support for this 
postulation are provided in the infrastructure and defense dynamics portions of 
this study (reference discussions beginning on pages 38 and 43, respectively) . 
Proposition (3): The overal l  unfavorable employment impact of base 
closure is mitigated to some degree by the public goods infrastructure vacuum 
created through efforts to promote private reutilization of these otherwise idle 
assets. The rationale for this proposition is discussed at length in the 
infrastructure portion of the background (reference discussion beginning on page 
38) . 
Proposition (4): Export driven regions are less sensitive to mil itary base 
indirect employment effects than  those regions with relatively lower ratios of 
5 
basic to non basic activity. It stands to reason that highly specialized regions 
export more, producing proportionally less for internal consumption. For these 
regions, employment growth is determined to a greater extent by outside 
demand. Therefore, employment effects of exogenous shocks, such as defense 
workforce expansions or contractions, are less pronounced in specialized 
regions. As an extreme example, personnel increases at a base located in a 
largely export driven county, l ike one of those comprising the Detroit MSA, will 
probably have only a small incremental impact since outside demand for 
automobiles is the major determinant of employment for this region. 
Proposition (5}: The effects of military base employment changes are 
relatively more pronounced in communities with proportionally smal ler non­
defense labor forces. This is expected because small economies are typical ly 
less developed and therefore not achieving their full potential for scale 
economies. Therefore, as the ratio of base personnel to the local labor force 
increases, the underlying effect of base employment changes on local 
employment is l ikely to be stronger. Conversely, as this ratio decreases, defense 
personnel employment effects are less pronounced. This distinction is 
particularly important in the case of defense downsizing (ordinary or BRAC 
related), when the local defense-to-labor force ratio is generally decreasing and 
the value of the corresponding change variable is necessarily negative. 
Consequently, the favorable employment pressures postulated in Proposition (2) 
are less pronounced under this proposition when the actual signs of the observed 
6 
values are taken into account. The GAO's descriptive statistics hint at this 
eventuality. Specifical ly, of the small BRAC communities, only 44 percent 
reported employment rates above the 1 997 national average, as compared to 60 
percent when al l major BRAC sites (small and large) were considered .2 
2 Reference GAO (1 998). 
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Chapter I I  
BASE CLOSURES AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
The Need for Closure 
Recognizing the DoD support structure was excessive given the services' 
roles and missions, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara launched efforts in 
the early 1 960's to reduce defense activities for 954 installations, to include 
closure of 60 major bases (Lall and Marlin, 1 992). The process spanned 1 6  
years and it wasn't always easy. As with all defense programs, reductions and 
closures proceeded only when specific funding was authorized and appropriated 
by Congress in response to the services' annual budget requests. Of course this 
process left room for inefficiencies in the form of bil l riders, political chit 
redemptions, and logrolling. For those representatives who weren't successful in 
protecting their constituents from a requested closure, the process was 
sometimes politically painful .  Not surprisingly, this ad hoc approach was 
interrupted in 1 977 when the services were prohibited from uni laterally making 
major realignments and adjustments to their supporting structure of military 
installations. Specifical ly, at bases of 300 or more civi l service employees, 
8 
U.S.C. Title 1 0, Section 2687 mandated Congressiona l  approval for restructuring 
actions that impacted more than 1 ,000 or half the resident federal workers. 
At the height of U .S.  involvement in Vietnam, the DoD employed 4 .9  
mill ion military members and federal civilians. By 1 975, when active participation 
in this conflict ended, the defense workforce numbered 3 .2  mil l ion (see Figure 1 
below) . Despite this 35 percent reduction in standing force and subsequent 
changes in national objectives, U .S.C. Title 1 0 effectively precluded further 
reductions to the defense infrastructure. 
In 1 989 the Berlin Wall toppled . Just two years later, member states 
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46 years of maintaining the mil itary forces and arsenals necessary to support 
Containment, Mutual Assured Destruction, and Detente foreign policies, the 
United States watched the Cold War thaw. Having already anticipated the 
withering of its greatest potential threat, the U .S. began work on a peace 
dividend in the late 1 980s. The plan ca l led for another sizable reduction in DoD 
personnel levels and military hardware inventories. U ltimately, this phased draw­
down released 1 .2 mil lion defense employees from 1 988 through 1 999. Along 
with these personnel actions, command structures were downsized; carrier 
groups, divisions, a ir wings, and strategic forces were slated for reductions in 
size or complete deactivation; and, weapons systems purchases were curtailed, 
or "stretched" over longer delivery horizons. With the exception of Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, overseas presence was scaled back over this 
same period. The political leadership was compelled to acknowledge fewer 
stateside bases were required to sustain post-Cold War operations for a 
department that was to shrink to 43 percent of its 1 968 manpower level .  Under 
the concept of scale economies, some form of military base consolidation and 
closure was eminent. The tremendous burden of maintaining infrastructure with 
excessive capacity needed to be lifted, or readiness and much needed weapons 
modernization and quality of l ife programs would suffer. 
Base Realignment and Closure Process 
Under the DoD force restructuring of the late 80's, the details regarding 
personnel and program priorities were left to the mil itary chiefs and service 
1 0  
secretaries for the most part. However, base closure and restructuring was 
another matter. As implied by U .S.C.  Title 1 0, concerns over base closure site 
selection extended beyond departmental walls. Certainly, the representatives of 
small towns whose largest employer was the DoD had more than a passing 
interest in the process of identifying stateside garrisons of 3,000 to 20,000 troops 
for dissolution. Recognizing the inevitable, Congress authorized establishment 
of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to inject integrity in 
the process and preclude logroll ing.3 
Essentially, the BRAC was designed as a body of nonpartisan members 
whose charter was to: (1 ) solicit realignment/closure candidates along with 
supporting facts and figures from the military services; (2) objectively evaluate 
the services' recommendations, making changes where deemed appropriate; 
and (3) forward the commission's recommendations to the President. The 
President was restricted to disapproving the BRAC's proposal in its entirety, or 
approving and forwarding it to Congress. The Congress was constrained 
similarly; line item adjustments to the list were not al lowed. If the Congress did 
not push the proposal back to the BRAC Commission for reconsideration within 
45 days of receipt, it became law. The services were given six years from 
passage of the law to execute the approved closure plan (OSD, 1 998). 4 
3 Since establishment of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the acronym 
BRAC, for "Base Realignment and Closure," has become the accepted reference to both the 
commission and the process (e.g. ,  "the 1 991 BRAC" or "BRAC '91 ") 
4 For the first BRAC (1 988), the commission itself was charged with identifying closure and 
realignment candidates, and the Secretary of Defense and Congress were the final review and 
approval authorities. 
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The approved candidate selection criteria used by the DoD for its submissions to 
the BRAC Commission are outlined in F igure 2 .  The first five criteria suggest 
DoD mission requirements and cost considerations ranked wel l  above economic 
concerns. In fact, under the last two BRAC rounds, eight of the 61 major facilities 
approved for reduction or closure were sti l l  endorsed despite the fact they were 
located in "highly vulnerable" communities.5 In general, the BRAC process 
seems to have supported DoD's selection criteria and priorities over "not in my 
backyard" politics. Biell ing's 1 996 analysis of base closure selection dynamics 
lends empirical support to this notion.  
Direct Effects of Four BRAC Rounds6 
The first BRAC convened in 1 988. Subsequently, Congress authorized 
three additional BRACs; one each in 1 991 , 1 993, and 1 995 .  Between these four 
rounds, a total of 261 stateside activities, to include 97 major instal lations, were 
identified for reduction or closure (Siehl, 1 996) .7 The mean net reduction through 
September 1 998 was 4, 1 09 mil itary and civil service employees per base, for a 
tota l of 398,592 personnel across al l  97 insta llations. Losses at individual sites 
5 In 1992, the Defense Conversion Commission designated areas with defense-related 
employment of 20 percent or more nhighly vulnerable." 72 such areas (MSAs and counties) were 
identified (Siehl, 1 996) . 
6 Sources for personnel figures are the fiscal year end Department of Defense Distribution of 
Personnel by State and by Selected Locations (M02 Reports), for 1987 through 1 998. 
Accordingly, values presented here are as of September 30, 1 998, Due to instances where 
adjustments were not complete by 1 998, these figures do not reflect final personnel levels under 
BRAC. 
7 For purposes of this study, a major BRAC facility, installation, or base is defined as one 
employing at least 300 military and defense civilians in 1 987 or thereafter. The 97 sites deemed 
major are listed in Appendix B . 
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Militai)' Value 
1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on 
operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force. 
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated 
airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations. 
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future 
total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving 
locations. 
4. The cost and manpower implications. 
Return on Investment 
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure 
or realignment, for the savings to exceed costs. 
Impacts 
6. The economic impact on communities. 
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' 
infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel. 
8. The environmental impact. 
Figure 2 - DoD's BRAC Candidate Selection Criteria 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Repon of the 
Depanment of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure. 
Washington DC: OSD, April 1 998. 
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ranged from less than 1 00 to as many as 1 9,800, with the median value being 
2,937. Seventy of the major BRAC bases experienced losses of 1 ,000 or more. 
In some cases, a given community hosted more than one instal lation . For 
example, the 97 major BRAC bases fell within 88 counties (or 59 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) for the 70 BRAC counties associated with an MSA) . 
Furthermore, a number of minor facilities affected by BRAC and a few major 
bases experiencing restructuring outside the BRAC realm shared some of these 
same communities. These co-located installations may have lost or gained 
personnel .  From the community perspective, the net defense personnel losses 
through September 30, 1 998 averaged 4,529 at the county level, and 6, 756 per 
MSA for the major BRAC localities. The hardest hit communities were Monterey 
County, California and the Philadelphia PA-NJ Primary MSA (PMSA), with losses 
of 1 9,800 and 33,005 respectively. 
The fiscal savings under the four BRAC rounds are substantia l .  As part of 
the DoD's major force reduction and reshaping measures, base closures have 
contributed greatly to the overall reduction in defense spending. While White 
House estimates place the savings of al l  these initiatives at 36 percent -- or $136 
bil lion across eleven years beginning with 1 989 -- BRAC is expected to reduce 
spending $57 billion over a 20-year window for its part (Siehl ,  1 996) . 
Indirect Effects of BRAC 
At the time of this study, 9-1 0 years of post-BRAC data are available for 
the first round, but only 2-3 years can be collected for BRAC '95 . Furthermore, 
1 4  
the gates are stil l  open at as many as 1 8  of the major BRAC bases slated for 
realignment or closure. Consequently, l ittle has been accomplished in the way of 
rigorous, comprehensive examinations of BRAC impact on loca l communities . 
However, there are a few qualitative assessments and l imited empirical studies 
that suggest the impact may have been short-lived and not as severe as 
anticipated for a number of communities. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) examined closure impacts on local 
communities, choosing rea l  per capita income (PCI) growth rates, and 
unemployment rates as the status indicators (GAO, 1 998). Of 62 communities 
party to 88 major base closures, 60 percent had lower unemployment rates than 
the national average at the start of BRAC (1 988), while that number improved to 
68 percent by 1 997.  With respect to PC I ,  55 percent of 49 major BRAC locales 
examined surpassed the national growth rate, while 41 percent exhibited 
negative growth for the period 1 988 to 1 991 .8 In contrast, 63 percent of these 
same areas exhibited growth rates equal to or greater than the national rate from 
1 991 to 1 995.  Of the 1 8  communities with below national average rates, only 
five reflected negative growth. An interesting point made in the study is that the 
national average PCI growth rate was only 0 .2 percent for 1 988 to 1 991 , whereas 
the same rate for 1 991  to 1 995 was 1 .5 percent. In other words, with respect to 
PC I ,  a large number of the BRAC communities seem to have lead the national 
economy in post-recession recovery. 
8 Thirteen communities impacted by BRAC '95 were excluded in the GAO's PCI analysis since 
data were not yet available. 
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To test the idea that metropolitan areas withstand closure impact better 
than smaller economies, the GAO compared deviations from aggregate U .S. 
unemployment rates and PCI growth rates of the smal ler closure communities 
with the overall BRAC values. The resu lts are inconclusive . Only 44 percent of 
the small communities had an unemployment rate below the 1 997 national 
average, as compared to 60 percent when al l  major BRAC sites are considered . 
But 71 percent of the rural sites had higher PCI growth than the national rate 
(1 991 to 1 995), as compared to 63 percent when small and large BRAC 
communities are combined . 
Finally, the GAO provided a qualitative assessment based on a sample of 
six BRAC sites visited. The localities were selected for their d iversity in 
population, geography, and general economic conditions. Based on interviews 
with community officials, the GAO concluded the impact of BRAC was less 
negative than anticipated for these regions. "Though some communities 
encountered negative economic impacts during the transition from the 
announcement of base closure to recovery, local officials said they are optimistic 
about the long-term outlook for their communities . . .  they now view base closure 
as an opportunity for their community to craft a new identity for itself and diversify 
the local economy." Factors submitted by the GAO to explain the better than 
expected outcome at most BRAC sites are summarized in F igure 3. 
In general, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) a lso concluded 
base closure impacts were not ruinous (Siehl ,  1 996) . Of the 95 major BRAC 
areas examined, only 33 had unemployment rates of 5.9 percent or higher for 
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Factors Affecting Economic Recovery from Base Closures 
Economic 
Recovery 
Figure 3 - Economic Recovery Factors Suggested by GAO 
Source: General Accounting Office. Military Bases: Status of Prior Base 
Realignment and Closure Rounds. Washington DC: GAO, NSIAD-99-36, 
1 998. 
May 1 995. Interestingly, a pattern was evident in these 33 communities. 
Specifical ly, two-thirds fell in just three states {1 4 in California, five in Lou isiana, 
and three in Texas) . Though not explicitly stated, the implication is once again 
that non-BRAC economic factors may have the strongest role in deciding a given 
community's fate. In either case, the report offers some optimism with regard to 
closures, stating " . . .  if reuse continues to show an increase in jobs, a reduction in 
adverse effects from military neighbors (such as noise, overflights, etc.), and 
redevelopment of military facil ities that enhances communities, then 
congressional opinion may favor additional financial savings through [more] base 
closures ." 
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As part of its 1 998 report to Congress, the DoD assessed the impact of 
BRAC in terms of unemployment compensation to federal civil ians (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 1 998) . A sample of thirty major closure bases was 
examined. The DoD found participation was approximately 1 4  percent of those 
eligible to draw compensation. However, since some tracking offices served 
multiple bases - BRAC and non-BRAC - and a number of 
claimants were victims of the general defense draw down, the true figure was 
l ikely something less than 1 4  percent. In either case, these results imply at least 
86 percent of the affected federal civilian workforce either relocated within the 
government, found non-federal employment, retired, or voluntarily chose not to 
return to work. 
For those former civil servants who drew benefits, the average length of 
unemployment was 1 7  weeks. Weekly payments were around 73 percent of the 
average maximum allowable amounts. Details were not available to explain the 
deviation from maximum payments, but one possibil ity is the mandatory offsets 
for temporary wage earnings of the displaced federal workers as they sought 
permanent employment. 
The DoD estimated total unemployment compensation payments to 
federal c ivilians directly impacted by all four BRAC rounds would approach $90 
million .  This estimate covers a span of 1 4  years (FY88 through FY01 ) .  I n  
contrast, over the period FY94 through FY97, annual unemployment claims 
reimbursements from the DoD to the states averaged $1 00 million. Ceteris 
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paribus, BRAC related claims are expected to represent less than 1 /1 4, or 6 .4 
percent of al l  DoD unemployment claims. 
The RAND Corporation conducted a limited review of BRAC impacts on 
local communities, and found that in general impacts were neither "catastrophic" 
nor "as severe as forecasted" (Dardia, 1 996) . These conclusions were reached 
through examination of three of Cal ifornia's largest BRAC bases: George Air 
Force Base (AFB) in San Bernardino County, Castle AFB in Merced County, and 
Fort Ord in Monterey County. The study focused on a number of descriptive 
measures for the neighboring communities. Specifical ly, for the period 1 991 -
1 994 (1 989-1 994 in the case of George AFB), it considered changes in 
populations, K-1 2 enrollments, labor force sizes, unemployment rates, taxable 
reta il sales levels, local government revenues, available housing units, vacancy 
rates, and average home sales prices. The benchmarks for assessing economic 
toll were various experts' predicted results; the economic status of a paired, or 
matching non-BRAC installation for each of the three bases; and the experiences 
of non-neighboring communities in the same counties as the three sites. Of 
course the researchers provide the disclaimer that the study is too l imited for 
results to be extrapolated across al l  BRAC sites. Nevertheless, it yields some 
valuable insight. 
With regard to the expert forecasts, in many cases the actual results were 
appreciably more favorable than predicted . For example, while local K-1 2 
enrollment was expected to decrease 30 and 50 percent at George and Castle, 
respectively, George actually experienced positive growth, and the drop at Castle 
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was closer to ten percent. Only city revenue and K-1 2 enrollment projections for 
Fort Ord, employment figures for George, and the population forecast for Castle 
were within five percent of actual outcomes. The latter was the only case where 
results were less favorable than forecasted for the 1 2  comparisons made. 
Under the paired-bases comparison, RAND attempted to match non-
BRAC bases having similar missions, personnel levels, and rural characteristics 
with George, Castle, and Fort Ord . The counterparts were Vandenberg AFB, 
Beale AFB, and Camp Pendleton, respectively. The matches were by no means 
precise, but perhaps adequate enough to draw the very general conclusion that 
the local economies probably would have experienced more favorable economic 
conditions had the three bases not closed . The authors freely recognize their 
study does not support conclusions about the degree of difference between 
actual and hypothetical outcomes, and that it marginally supports statements 
about the direction of these would-be metrics. But, a fairly reasonable inference 
of their work is that the non-BRAC component of local economic trends may 
overshadow BRAC related impacts. For example, al l  eight metrics for George 
were approximately the same or significantly more favorable than those of 
Vandenberg, even though George was the base that closed .9 
RAN D's final comparison was between economic conditions in the 
immediate vicinity of George, Castle, and Fort Ord, and those of their respective 
counties. In the latter two cases, the authors find general support for the 
9 Comparative metrics were population, housing units, vacancy rates, unemployment, labor force, 
city revenue, K-1 2 enrollment, and retail sales. 
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expectation that the brunt of BRAC impacts are felt most at the sub-county level. 
Specifically, for most of the metrics the local values were of the same sign but 
lagged, or were less favorable than the county level figures. In the case of 
George AFB, the local community approximated or led the county's performance 
to a considerable degree. This unexpected outcome suggests that unrelated 
regional factors may have a role in mitigating the negative impact normal ly 
expected from base closure. 
Economic Relief 
Accommodation of the United States' long-term armed forces posture was 
the DoD's primary focus during BRAC deliberations. But the closure process and 
the parties involved were not oblivious to economic issues, particularly as they 
related to recovery at the sites chosen. Though the military's proposals were 
general ly accepted, there were instances where recommendations were 
overturned. For example, in 1 993, the Air Force's seemingly impartial and 
objective eva luation of East Coast air mobility wing a lternatives concluded 
McGuire AFB, NJ should revert to reserve status with the remainder of the 
mission transferring to Plattsburg AFB, NY. Yet, a study by Bernardi (1 996) 
suggests that for no apparent operational or cost rationale, the Commission 
disregarded this assessment, and recommended Plattsburg close completely 
while McGuire retain the mission. I n  another instance, the 1 995 BRAC 
Commission added the huge Air Force maintenance and repair depots at Kelly 
AFB and McClellan AFB (San Antonio and Sacramento, respectively) to the 
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closure list contrary to the Pentagon's wishes (Kitfield, 1 995) . Finally, in an effort 
to a lleviate the layoff fears of some 1 8, 700 federal civilians at Kelly and 
McClellan, the Pentagon and White House launched a "privatization in place" 
initiative subsequent to BRAC 95 (Economist, 1 995) . The objective was to 
preserve jobs for as many employees as possible while transferring ownership of 
the depot operations to the corporate sector. Ideally, the depot personnel would 
leave work as civil servants one day, and return the next day as defense 
contractor employees . Cases l ike these were exceptions to the rule. But they do 
suggest that parties on all sides of the BRAC table were not completely 
insensitive to economic impacts in closure communities. 
To explicitly address economic concerns after BRAC recommendations 
were approved, the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) under the Secretary of 
Defense was charged with facil itating resource conversion and reuti l ization. In 
fact, a sel ling point for a number of closure candidates was that these assets 
(mil itary land areas and in some cases, structures) could be released to the local 
government and commercial sectors, to the benefit of the effected communities. 
As Secretary of Defense Will iam Perry noted in the preface to the Community 
Guide to Base Reuse, "When we must close or cut back one of our mil itary 
installations, we do it with great regret. But we also do it with great interest in 
seeing the lands and facilities reborn as new additions to a community's 
economy, job base and quality of life . . .  " To that end, the OEA has followed the 
services' preparation of sites for transfer; overseen the marketing of these sites; 
assisted community leaders in their organization and planning for transition; 
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administered relief in the form of cash grants; and tracked direct jobs created as 
a result of these efforts. 
As of February 1 998, the OEA provided $231 mil lion in grants across the 
major BRAC locations (GAO, 1 998) . Though the OEA has held the primary role 
in reuse, three other federal agencies joined in providing financial assistance to 
BRAC communities: the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the 
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
Through 1 997, these three groups provided another $81 6 million in cash grants, 
for a tota l of $1 .047 bil l ion toward relief and reutil ization (GAO, 1 998) . 10 These 
relief funds are directly tied to BRAC, and tracked accordingly. The CRS claims 
Congress has provided more than $ 1 0  bil lion in total financial assistance (Siehl, 
1 996) . However, some of the uses actual ly fal l  under the broader umbrella of 
defense draw down relief (e.g . ,  transition assistance for displaced DoD workers, 
defense industry conversion assistance, etc.). 
Additional assistance was provided to BRAC communities in the form of 
conveyance relief. Specifically, the initial intent of the DoD was to parcel out land 
and facil ities at closed sites to local development authorities for fair market value. 
The expected revenues were even factored into the cost-benefit analysis 
submitted to the BRAC Commission, and subsequently included as offsets in the 
BRAC budgets for facil ity preparation, cleanup and closure (Brown, 1 989; OSD, 
10 While grants from the other three agencies were spread over most the major BRAC 
communities to help with reuse planning, infrastructure development, and worker retraining, the 
FAA's $271 million contribution was targeted to 27 sites which offered benefits like improved air 
traffic control and decreased route congestion. 
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1 998) . However, in response to local civic leaders' complaints about expenses 
and unduly long delays in transfer, the emphasis shifted from obtaining fair va lue 
to expediting the release of these assets (CBO, 1 996) . For example, in 2000, 
under Congressional authority, the Air Force is expected to forgive as much as 
$1 00 million of the Kelly Greater Development Authority's land conveyance debt 
for property on the BRAC listed Kelly AFB in San Antonio (Air Force Times, 
2000) . 
According to the OEA's 1 988, 1 99 1, 1 993 and 1 995 BRAG Actions Base 
Reutilization Status report, through March 1 999, new leases and deeds resulting 
from reuse activity amounted to 1 ,262 and 1 24, respectively for the 77 stateside 
reuse sites tracked. Additiona lly, post-BRAC reutilization measures generated 
53,91 9  new direct jobs. Federal civilian job losses for these same locations were 
1 35,84 7 .  The annual DoD Distribution of Personnel by State and Selected 
Locations reports indicate the corresponding military personnel losses were 
approximately 1 96,029. I n  short, reutilization has generated 1 new directjob for 
every 6 federal jobs lost. 
Empirical Examinations of Closure Impacts 
Hooker and Knetter (1 999) employ a counterfactual approach to analyzing 
the impact of base closures, contrasting actual county level employment and PCI 
growth rates with those that would have occurred (1 ) had the county measures 
continued to grow at their respective state's rate; and (2) had the ex post margin 
between county and state measures mirrored that of the pre-closure period . The 
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differential is assumed to represent the jobs lost or PCI change as a result of the 
closures. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to estimate overal l  job loss 
multipliers (the dependent variable being jobs lost under the counterfactual 
scenarios, and the independent variable being direct defense jobs lost through 
closures) . Establ ishing 't as a g iven base's year of closure, a single independent 
variable regression is run for every combination of the following: employment as 
the independent variable; the independent variable measured at 't, t+l,  't + 2, 't + 
3, and 't + 4; the dependent variable measured under the sustained state growth 
rate scenario; and the scenario assumed to begin at 't - 1 , and 't -2 (total of 20 
equations) . Similar regressions are run for the sustained growth rate differential 
scenario. In an analogous fashion, PCI change multipliers are a lso estimated . 
The greatest explanatory power is provided in the job loss model, with the 
counterfactual baseline beginning at 't - 2, under the matching county-state 
growth rate scenario. 1 1  All five of the individually estimated coefficients Oob loss 
multipliers) are highly significant and their corresponding models yield R2 values 
ranging from 0.46 to 0 .63. Of greater interest is that for 't = 1 through 4, the 
multipliers are between 0 .90 and 0 .97, and they do not test significantly d ifferent 
11 As the authors note, the relatively stronger results under a t - 2 baseline vs. t - 1 reinforce the 
notion that closures were either gradual or anticipated. With respect to counterfactual 
assumptions, of 57 observations, 22 were lost under the sustained growth rate differential 
scenario. Based on additional testing, the author's identify potential sample selection problems 
with this scenario, and therefore suggest the sustained state growth rate scenario is a preferable 
approach. 
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from 1 at the five percent level . 12 This implies that for the first four years 
following closure (and presumably indefinitely thereafter) the only impact is the 
direct base job loss. Under the t -1 baseline, the multipliers are even smaller. In 
either case, since all the estimated multipliers have va lues less than 1 ,  the 
results suggest closure county employment actually grew at a faster rate than 
that of the state, providing " . . .  evidence of indirect or induced job creation!" 
These findings lend credence to the idea that base closures may present 
opportunities to local economies in the form of an infrastructure vacuum. It is 
worth noting Hooker and Knetter test for nonlinear relationships between 
counterfactua l  county job loss and base employment loss, finding no evidence of 
its existence. Furthermore, they obtain an unexpected negative sign from 
interaction between the shock and a rural dummy variable, but the effect tests 
insignificant. 
Regarding PC I, the authors find closures have l ittle impact. At first glance 
this seems odd given the other results imply employment losses are restricted to 
just the direct base jobs lost. Though the military base self-sufficiency argument 
goes a long way toward balancing these two outcomes, there is stil l some 
propensity on the part of base employees to spend downtown. This off-base 
income is forever lost when the base closes and the employee is transferred. If 
off-base employment does not change, the region's PCI should decrease --
12 At t =0, b =0.69 and the hypothesis that b =1 is rejected at the five percent level. The authors 
offer no explanation, though it is likely this is because assigned personnel were not relieved of 
duty en masse on the first day of the reported closure year. 
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unless the mean PCI for base employees is below that of the surrounding 
community. This is exactly the reconciliatory explanation offered by Hooker and 
Knetter. On average the PCI for military members is below that of their civilian 
neighbors (as much as 1 /3 lower) . If it is assumed that junior civilian base 
employees are more apt to out-migrate than their senior peers with stronger ties 
to the region, the same may be said for these young civil servants who depart the 
region. This provides a boost to the PCI average for those remaining in the area, 
offsetting the decrease from lost income. 
Hooker and Knetter acknowledge some unresolved issues in their base 
closure review. Specifically, as noted earlier in this study, assistance provided by 
the OEA and other government agencies may have had a role in mitigating the 
effects of defense job losses. In fact, for every six direct jobs lost under BRAC, 
the OEA takes credit for creation of one new permanent job under its reuse and 
reutilization efforts (OEA, 1 999) . The second concern involves the possibil ity of 
self-selection bias if regional adaptabil ity was a consideration in the base 
selection criteria, even if such consideration was not openly acknowledged by the 
parties involved . However, as they indicate, it is likely any such bias is small 
given a fair number of bases in "vulnerable" communities were stil l selected . 
Krizan (1 998) uses a comprehensive establishment-level panel data set 
covering all private employment in California (1 989-1 996) to examine effects of 
military base employment in that state, at the level they are most expected to 
occur. Specifically, Krizan models establishment net employment growth rate as 
a function of net defense personnel changes for bases within defined radii of the 
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establishment; the ratio of base personnel to local labor force, for bases within 50 
miles of the establishment; and, the establishment's age and size. Dummies are 
included to control for other economic factors (i .e . ,  the establ ishment's industry 
classification; the SMSA where the establishment is located; whether the 
establishment is a single-unit business, or part of a multi-unit company; and, the 
year of observation) . 1 3  Annual changes in defense personnel levels for al l  
California bases (BRAC and non-BRAC) are incorporated in the data set. 
Establishment-level observations are drawn from the Census Bureau's Standard 
Statistica l  Establishment List, which contains comprehensive multi-sector 
microdata for all lawful concerns having positive payroll .  Krizan's final data set 
was compiled from approximately 4 .  7 mill ion observations. 
I n  light of the descriptive and limited empirical studies a lready discussed, 
the results of Krizan's examination are not surprising. The coefficients for the 
effects of net base employment changes on establishment growth rates have the 
expected positive signs, and are significant, but quite smal l .  Specifically, at al l  
the establishment-to-base distances, the change in growth rate per employment 
change of 1 ,000 base workers is well under 1 %.14  Included in the regression 
model is an interaction variable to assess the relative importance of military 
installations to their local economy (the product of base personnel change and 
the ratio of base personnel to private sector labor force) . At a ll but the 5 mile 
13 These control dummies are used throughout the analysis. Related details are not presented in 
the study. However, Krizan does state there are no unexpected patterns in these variables. 
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radius, the effects are significant, but negative, suggesting private sector 
employment in rural or small town environments is less likely to contract with 
base draw downs. As noted, this is counter to the common belief that base 
closures will have a greater negative impact on smaller communities. It may be 
that a large share of the rural California communities hosting bases also rely on 
agriculture as their primary basic activity. Since food exports are not l ikely to be 
correlated with local defense activities, production for these agricultural 
communities should be fairly immune from exogenous base closures. 
Krizan a lso runs a second model that employs the absolute values of 
establishment net growth rates as the dependent variable. The idea here is to 
measure the degree of "churning," or resource reallocation for business entities 
potentially effected by base closures.1 5 I n  this variation, the coefficients for base 
employment changes are a lso positive and significant, implying churning 
decreases with drops in base personnel levels. Furthermore, the coefficients 
diminish with distance . Together, these results suggest the decrease in churning 
associated with base closures is more pronounced for establishments closest to 
the bases. To better understand this outcome, Krizan uses pro bit models to 
examine establishment births and deaths as a function of the same factors. 
14 Establishment-to-base distance measures are at 5 mile increments, from 0 to 50 miles. 
Between o and 50 miles, the effects range from 0.0% to 0.6% with no apparent distance-related 
trend. 
15 In the author's words, churning is n . . . both expansion and contraction of continuing 
establishments' employment levels as well as the opening and closing of whole plants. Such 
transfers of resources can be an essential component of economic growth by facilitating the 
adoption of new technology . . .  and enhancing productivity growth through a process of 'creative 
destruction.'" However, churning also imposes an economic cost in the form of frictional 
unemployment. This is the cost Krizan is attempting to assess. 
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Regarding births, the coefficients are positive and decreasing with distance, 
implying the probability of new births decreases with base personnel losses, 
particularly closer to the base. Coefficients for the interaction term (base 
personnel change x ratio of base personnel to private sector labor force) are 
negative at distances below 40 miles, and positive for greater distances. 
Together, these results suggest under closure conditions, new births are most 
likely in smaller mil itary communities, closer to the base. 
Results for the establishment deaths probit model are tough to interpret. 
Only half the coefficients are significant, and the coefficients vary in sign 
depending on distance. If any conclusion can be drawn, it's that establishments 
farther away are more likely to close with the installation than are those closer to 
the base. Ca ll ing on the work of Dardia, et. a l .  (1 996), Krizan suggests retirees 
may help explain this phenomenon. Specifically, military retirees often plant 
their roots in communities which host bases to take advantage of medica l 
benefits and relatively lower prices at the commissaries and base exchanges 
(both of which are exempt from collecting state sales taxes) . When the base 
closes, retirees must shift their patronage for these goods and services to the 
local economy. This helps explain the overal l  dampened impacts of closures. 
The role of distance may also be explained, in part, by diminishing housing 
opportunities close to the base for active duty military members. This is 
conceivable given the propensity of military retirees to gravitate around bases, 
and the more permanent nature of the retiree's domicile (i .e . ,  military members 
typically transfer every 2-3 years) . Displaced by a steadily expanding retired 
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population, the relatively turbulent base workforce gradually accepts longer 
commutes to work. When the base shuts down and the base employees 
dissipate, it is the farther reaches of the local area that are most effected .  Of 
course the fact that the OEA actively promotes reutilization of closed defense 
facilities may also help explain seemingly counterintuitive results related to 
distance. 
When Krizan runs the same models weighted for employment (vs. the 
establishment orientation), he finds local labor force employment prospects 
improve with base personnel losses (the effect being more pronounced in small 
towns) . Aga in, the military retiree hypothesis is submitted . To test this 
hypothesis, Krizan runs the models separately for employment growth rates in 
the Food Stores SIC, the General Merchandise Stores SIC, and al l other non­
reta il industries combined . For the most part, the coefficients are negative and 
significant, though the magnitudes are appreciably greater in the two retai l SIC's. 
These results corroborate the shift in patronage theory. 
Impact Multipliers and Self-Sufficiency 
As noted in a CRS study, "Mi litary bases were often designed to be self 
sufficient and intentionally separate from the surrounding community" (Siehl, 
1 996) . This self-sufficiency characteristic of mil itary instal lations tends to l imit the 
indirect and induced impacts of draw downs and closures. In support of this 
notion, Brauer and Marlin (1 992), and Dardia et. a l .  (1 996) h int at factors such as 
the tendency for active duty military to occupy government provided housing and 
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consume goods provided through the base, (e.g. ,  recreation service, legal 
support, organized worship, and health care) at little or no cost to themselves. 
The composition of the federal civilian workforce is a contributing factor as wel l .  
Specifically, veterans receive hiring preferences and prior mil itary experience is 
often a desirable credential for defense civil service employment. Consequently, 
some defense civilians also have military retirement benefits entitling them to 
some of those same on-base privileges. 
A simplified example may illustrate in part why military base closure 
impacts are l imited relative to other regional shocks. Think of a mil itary base as 
a fortress island connected by bridge with its host community. All civilians live on 
the mainland, while a large portion of the military employees and their families 
live on the island . Given the availabil ity of low or no cost consumption on-base, 
military families obtain a substantial portion of their needs on the base, even if 
they reside on the mainland. Some of the federal civilians have military retiree 
benefits and therefore obtain a portion of their needs on-base too. The 
remainder of their needs, and that of al l  other federal civil ians and contractors are 
met off base. Assume local civilian PCI equa ls or exceeds that of federal 
civil ians, which equals or exceeds that of military members .16 The host 
community's regional employment multipl iers for mil itary personnel should be 
less than those of federal civilians, which should be less than those of defense 
contractors and al l  other civilians. This ordina l relationship is reflected in the 
16 Hooker and Knetter (1 999) find some support for this assumption about relative incomes. 
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Pentagon's use of generic rural and urban multipliers to approximate those of 
mil itary and defense civil ian employees: 1 .2 and 1 .8, respectively (Brauer and 
Marlin, 1 992). Outside researchers have given recognition to this pattern in their 
multiplier assumptions as well. For example, Lall and Marlin (1 992) use 1 .2, 1 .8 ,  
and 2 .5 for military. defense civilian, defense contractor multipliers, respectively, 
in their state-level defense industry impact analysis. 
Self sufficiency helps explain in general why mil itary base closure shocks 
can be expected to be smaller than other regiona l shocks. But, forecasts of 
shock-induced growth or decl ine involve hard numbers, often computed from 
economic base or regional input-output ( 1-0) multipliers. Therefore, 
understanding the favorable differential between actual impacts and what many 
projected for base closures also requires a look at the assumptions underlying 
the derivation of these multipliers. 
Closures in an Economic Base or Input-Output Framework 
I n  the context of an economic base framework, it is common to view the 
activities of the military base as wholly basic. This goes back to the public goods 
concepts of joint consumption, nonexcludabil ity, free-riding, and will ingness to 
pay. Because price will not serve as an effective mechanism for al locating 
defense, the individual town, county, or MSA by itself has virtua lly no impact on 
the demand for defense. Only the collective voice of all communities determines 
the appropriate level supplied. This collective voice is represented by the federal 
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government. 1 7  Hence, from the local community perspective, the demand for 
nationa l security is generally held to be exogenous, or basic. On the surface, 
then, the local impact of closing a base is (b + n)/b, where b is basic (export 
driven) industry, n is nonbasic industry, and base employment is a component of 
b. By way of example, if base employment is 4,000, employment for the 
remaining basic industry is 6,000, and nonbasic employment is 7,000, the 
multiplier is (b + n)/b = [{4,000 + 6,000) + 7,000]/ {4,000 + 6,000) = 1 .7 .  But this 
presumes the base consumes nonbasic goods and services in the same 
proportion as the region's remaining basic industries. There is good reason to 
believe that is not the case. Specifically, bases typica lly provide much of their 
own support, or nonbasic activities, even though these activities are considered 
basic under the exogenous good of defense. At most bases, these organical ly 
provided support activities include, but are not l imited to roads, grounds, housing 
and other infrastructure maintenance services provided through the civil 
engineering squadron; law enforcement for the base and its residents; operations 
related warehousing and retai l services provided through base supply; hospitals, 
legal, chapel, and counseling services for mil itary personnel and their families; 
etc. In contrast, many of these functions are truly nonbasic for off-base industry. 
As such, actual base-related nonbasic activity should be proportionally less than 
that suggested by regional economic base multipliers. Intu itively, then, base 
closure impact estimates derived from regional multipliers are l ikely overstated -
17 See Mueller (1 996) for a more thorough d iscussion on collective provisioning of public goods. 
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in part from use of an inflated multipl ier, and in part from its application to an 
inflated basic shock (recall, the multiplier is applied to the entire base 
employment loss, not just the truly basic portion) . 
Within the Input-Output (1 -0) context, the 1 -0 table design explicitly places 
military bases in the final demand portion of the table, under the exogenously 
determined government sector. The effects of changes in this sector (direct 
effects) on the endogenous interindustry and household sectors (indirect and 
induced effects) are the subject of base closure impact analysis. Specifica lly, 
besides the employment of base personnel, the base has an indirect impact on 
the loca l economy through loca l base contracts and purchases, and an induced 
impact through the local spending of household income generated from the direct 
and indirect jobs. Being exogenously determined, the direct effect is given: it is 
the number of military and federal civilian positions removed through rea lignment 
or closure. It is the indirect and induced effects that must be estimated . 
Existing 1-0 tables focus primarily on the interregional relationships, 
interindustry dependencies and household demand. Defense operations are 
only broadly addressed in the exogenous government sector, if at a l l .  In practice, 
multipliers are developed by either fitting military bases into the economic base 
framework (potential pitfalls already discussed), or piggybacking on existing 1 -0 
industry multipliers to meet current needs. As an example of the latter, analysis 
guidelines under the most recent BRAC round required the use of standardized 
multipliers adapted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) produced 
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Regional Input-Output Modeling System {RIMS 1 1) . 1 8  In essence, multipliers for 
the "general" installations and the "specialized" bases categorized as depots, 
research and development bases, and ammunition production facil ities were 
empirical ly inferred from a cross-section of multipliers for SIC "equivalents," 
across 53 regions. Because the objective was to develop a consistent cost 
analysis approach that did not understate impacts, the guidance acknowledges 
that the underlying assumptions result in multipliers that intentionally overstate 
impacts .19 However, even correcting for these assumptions, gross impact 
estimates are l ikely to be overstated for reasons analogous to those discussed 
under base closures in an economic base framework. Specifically, in any study 
founded on analogy, it may be a stretch to presuppose privately owned 
enterprises exact the same indirect and induced effects on the local economy as 
"similar" government run operations. Consider the Air Force depot which by 
analogy is probably best approximated by the a ircraft and aircraft parts 
manufacturing SICs. Certainly, the core operations are very similar. Both groups 
buy, manufacture, distribute, repair, and service aircraft or aircraft components. 
But in reality, the aircraft SIC multipliers are l ikely to be higher than those of their 
government brothers because, once again, bases typical ly provide much of their 
18 Guidelines and an overview of multiplier derivation are contained in the Economic Impact 
Database, 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (1 995) . 
19 For example, base related induced consumption is assumed to be permanently removed when 
the base closes. However, some displaced workers find employment locally, and still others 
retire in the area and continue spending. For these individuals, local off-base services take the 
place of services previously obtained through the base (e.g. ,  health care). Assumptions 
regarding the equation used to fit the data, and explicit upward adjustments to the estimated 
multipliers are also sources of impact overestimation under this particular guidance. In short, the 
(continued on next page) 
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own support, or "indirect" activities, even though these activities are considered 
"direct" along with the core function of the base for regiona l l -0 purposes. So 
when a depot shuts down, the vehicle fuels section of supply and the chaplain's 
staff are counted as direct impacts, yet off base their equivalents are indirect and 
induced losses if Lockheed downsizes. To exacerbate this disconnect, when the 
larger private industry based multiplier is applied to the depot, it is applied to an 
inflated base that includes medical support, law enforcement, the vehicle fuels 
section, the chaplain, and many others. 
The implications of economic base and 1-0 approaches to base closure 
impact analysis are evident in the disparity between actual and projected 
impacts. When bases were under review for inclusion in the various BRAC 
rounds, impact projections forwarded to the committee were often gloomy, if not 
catastrophic. As Dardia (1 996) suggests, a number of these estimates may have 
been tainted since they were conducted under grassroots efforts to lobby against 
closure. But, even given the benefit of the doubt, it is l ikely local ana lysts 
employed some form of economic base factor or adapted 1-0 multiplier. And, as 
the examples above i l lustrate, there is a strong possibil ity even the most 
objective of studies included inappropriate multipliers, appropriate multipliers 
applied to the wrong base, or both. Other than cases of simple neglect or 
arbitrary speculation, it is difficult to conceive of a scenario where any one of 
these oversights could produce a downward biased impact estimate . Yet, given 
resulting 1-0 multipliers generate relative vulnerability indices rather than true impact 
assessments. 
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that actual impacts were lower than most anticipated, the development and 
application of upward biased multipliers is not only possible, but l ikely. 
Infrastructure's Role in Limiting Impacts 
The descriptive and empirical studies reviewed thus far allude to industry's 
reuse of freed public resources, both on and off base, as a possible explanation 
for better than expected post-BRAC regional economies. Recent findings in the 
fiscal policy field also support the idea that reutilization opportunities in the form 
of idle public infrastructure may have a significant role in mitigating the impacts of 
base closures. Specifically, fiscal pol icy studies often focus on determining if a 
causal relationship can be established between public goods provisioning and 
regional growth. There are two principal reasons why such a relationship may 
exist. From the individual's perspective, public goods may serve as amenities 
that entice inmigration .2° From the view of the firm, economies of scale under 
public provisioning may translate to low cost factors of production (e.g. ,  water 
delivery, sewer and waste removal, highways and ports for shipping, etc) . In 
either context, the base closure and reuse process may be viewed as surrogate 
public expenditures. In a reutilization capacity, the bases represent an injection 
of ready- or near ready-to-use infrastructure; from roads and grounds, to utilities, 
telecommunications, plant and equipment. Furthermore, when a base population 
vacates, a public goods vacuum is created in the surrounding communities which 
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provided the schools, police and fire protection, developed residential areas, 
highways, and public utilities necessary to host their DoD neighbors. Therefore, 
if BRAC did not invoke severe hardship on local communities as studies seem to 
indicate, the fiscal policy literature may offer some useful insight into why this 
may be the case. 
In a study of local economies, Eberts (1 991 ) empirical ly examines the role 
of publicly provided infrastructure in promoting metropolitan economic growth. 
By breaking down public expenditure into the categories of new investment (i .e . ,  
additions to capital stock) and maintenance of existing public capita l, he develops 
support for the intuitive notion that it is new investment in infrastructure, and not 
gross public expenditures that spurs growth. From the amenity and margina l 
productivity standpoint, it may be that increased public capital stock per capita is 
a necessary condition for promoting employment growth. E mpirically, Eberts 
finds support for this conclusion. He also finds public expenditures to susta in 
existing infrastructure are not significantly correlated with regional growth. This 
presents a di lemma for many communities. Since local budgets are 
constrained, they must balance their need to arrest or slow the deterioration of 
existing infrastructure with their need to build for tomorrow's economic growth. I n  
older communities, the more immediate need for sustainment often wins out. For 
example, Eberts notes that in 1 985 only two cents of every public dollar 
expended on Cleveland's infrastructure actua lly went toward new capita l .  
2° For example, Herzog and Schlottmann (1 986) find recreational features, low crime rates, and 
accessibility to educational opportunities are significant migration determinants. 
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Though residents may prefer the improved economic conditions growth offers, 
efforts to increase the new investment vs. sustainment ratio meet resistance 
since these measures come as a sacrifice or an added expense to those same 
residents. However, as suggested above, military base reuse may represent a 
low or no cost alternative to new investment. 
Fox and Murray (1 991 ) explore the effects of sub-state fiscal policies on 
industry dynamics, focusing on new entries or growth in existing businesses 
related to local public revenue structure, expenditure patterns, and infrastructure. 
They find that specific changes to tax rates and expenditures have little impact 
on firm startups and location decisions in the near-term. It is only through the 
long run impact of a variety of policies that local governments can hope to see 
enhanced economic growth. Though economic climate and the cost of labor and 
transportation overshadow local revenue and expenditure policy as firm entry 
determinants, infrastructure and education are identified as two public sector 
vehicles with potential  to significantly impact development. Again, freed 
resources under base closures may approximate new spending in either or both 
these areas. 
Papke's 1 991 examination of industry responsiveness to state tax 
differentials finds that industry location decisions are influenced by these 
differences at the state level. Specifically, taxes have the expected inverse 
relationship with both business starts and expansions. More importantly, from 
the provisioning side she concludes the location decision for some industries 
appears to be positively influenced by differences in public expenditures. These 
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findings suggest new infrastructure with l ittle or no new accompanying 
expenditure should result in favorable conditions for regional growth . 
Dalenberg and Partridge (1 995} explicitly address the twofold impact of 
infrastructure on employment discussed earlier: as an amenity to workers (and 
firms}, and as an unpaid input in the production process. At the MSA level, they 
find that revenue and expenditure policies significantly influence total 
employment levels. I n  particular, both lower taxe� and increased expenditures 
on public education have positive effects on employment growth . 
When Dalenberg et. a l .  (1 998) revisit the role of infrastructure in regional 
employment growth, they attempt to corroborate or counter the findings of recent 
state-level research, which suggests that public capital has little influence on 
output. They find flaws with previous studies that use production function or cost 
function approaches to measure the effects of public spending on output. 
Inherent problems with these approaches include difficulties measuring state 
output; nonexistence of state-level price deflators; potential for inputs and outputs 
to be model driven; accounting for spillover effects; inability to capture indirect 
effects (e.g. , infrastructure as a paid/unpaid production input; as an amenity that 
attracts workers; and as a synergistic effect on the productivity of other inputs); 
etc. To address these concerns, Dalenberg and company look at the direct 
effect of infrastructure on employment. Some distinct advantages of this angle 
include enhanced reliability of data; absence of the need to normalize prices; and 
ability to control for varying state characteristics (e.g. ,  demographics, industry 
structure, and noninfrastructure amenities) . The study considers both highway 
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expenditures, and public spending net of highway expenditures vs. changes in 
employment. In both cases a significant positive relationship is evident.21 
F inally, in an effort to explain the outmigration of manufacturing from the 
"Rust Belt" to the South, Crandall (1 993) attributes most of the shift to wage 
differentials and the degree of unionization. However, he a lso identifies 
infrastructure as having a significant influence during the period 1 97 7  through 
1 989. Regarding policy prescriptions to ease the losses from the North, his work 
suggests public capital may have a valid role to play in workforce and industrial 
retention . 
The implication of the preceding studies is that reuti lization potential may 
be a mitigating factor in the impact of base closures on local economies. Just 
like new public goods expenditures, freed up public capital can be an amenity or 
a factor of production that promotes inmigration and regional growth. As an 
obvious example, consider the closure of a base with an operable airfield, like 
Chanute AFB in Springfield, IL .  In a municipal capacity, the a irport offers many 
attractive features, to include freight handling and movement, transportation 
convenience, access to markets, and rel ief to already congested a irports and 
routes servicing neighboring communities. Even the less obvious examples of 
installations with l ittle more than land to offer represent reuse potential in the 
form of public parks and recreation areas. 
21 With regard to production and cost function approaches to examining infrastructure's role, 
Dalenberg et. al .  (1 998, p. 46) attribute the differences in results to the failure of those techniques 
(continued on next page) 
42 
Defense Dynamics and Labor Redistribution 
County level effects of base realignments and closures, or defense 
downsizing in general, may be less than d isastrous or even beneficial when one 
considers defense accession and attrition dynamics. Specifical ly, only one of six 
counties in the United States has a defense presence. Excluding counties with 
less than 300 defense employees, this number drops to one in nine . During 
periods of defense expansion, these 348 counties draw defense workers, or 
recruits from across al l  3,092 counties nationwide. Granted, defense counties 
l ikely contribute a greater than average share of this labor since the local 
installations serve to influence potential mil itary recruits and offer nearby 
employment to prospective civil servants. But even so, a substantial percentage 
of DoD employees are recruited from outside defense counties. Many of these 
individuals do not return to their original home of record when they leave service. 
Given the psychic costs related to job search and relocation, a fair number 
remain in the area of their last duty station and assimilate into the local labor 
force. This is especial ly true in an era of outsourcing and privatizing, when 
former defense employees find their skills are highly valued and sought after 
locally. What's more, mil itary retirees generally exhibit a trend of settling near 
installations to take advantage of base related benefits as they begin second 
careers. In short, defense business cycles serve to redistribute the supply of 
private labor. The result is often supply driven regional growth. 
to recognize the " . . .  amenity role of public infrastructure in attracting capital and labor." 
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Chapter Ill 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Impact Model Design 
An empirical regression based approach is used to test anticipated 
relationships against a panel data set spanning 1 978 through 1 997 .  County level 
non-farm private industry employment is the dependent variable.22 The 
independent variables include defense personnel levels for all stateside 
installations (BRAC and non-BRAC) plus related characteristics, and peripheral 
regional factors, or control variables that influence county-level employment. The 
defense variables are the central focus of the study, and they are modeled as the 
direct effects, or exogenously determined employment changes, congruent with 
views held in practice. In using private employment as the left-hand side 
variable, only the indirect effects of mil itary base employment changes are 
captured in this figure. The results yield multipliers that differ somewhat from 
those obtained through analogy and adaptation of existing industry data, but the 
methodology is more defensible. The results of this study complement the 
22 Appendix A contains a variation of the final model of this study, where the dependent variable 
is per capita income rather than employment. 
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findings in Krizan's 1 998 longitudinal study, which was confined to modeling 
realignment impacts in California only. 
Levels and Changes Dynamic Models of Employment Impact 
Causal analysis of regional employment as a function of local military 
employment can be examined with the change in regional employment as a 
function of the change in military employment (the "Changes" model) . It can also 
be modeled with the change in regional employment as some function of the 
level of military employment (the "Levels" model) . Finally, it can be modeled with 
the level of regional employment as a function of the level of military employment 
(the "Levels/Levels" model) . In the case of a dynamic model, with a lagged 
dependent variable, the "Levels" and the "Levels/Levels" models yield the same 
estimates since both forms minimize the same prediction error. As such, this 
study narrows the choice to that of a "Changes" or a "Levels/Levels" model 
(herein referred to as Changes and Levels, respectively) . Bartik (1 991 ) presents 
a good review of the relative merits of these two techniques. Basically, the 
appeal of the Changes approach lies in its abil ity to mitigate concerns with 
omitted variable bias when it comes to time-invariant factors difficult to measure 
or quantify, but believed to have a significant effect on the dependent variable 
(e.g. ,  community or firm espirit de corps as it relates to output) . In essence, 
since the Changes model involves first differencing both sides of the model, 
these troublesome but constant fixed effects fall out of the equation. 
Consequently, their intentional or overlooked omission from the model is a moot 
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point. On the other hand, first differencing a lso removes a Jot of information 
regarding actual variation in the observed variables, without a commensurate 
reduction in the overall measurement error. In other words, when measurement 
error is possible or l ikely, the Changes model will reflect a higher ratio of 
measurement error to true variance, resulting in a greater bias. But, as Baltagi 
{1 995) notes, an advantage of panel data is that it lessens these concerns given 
the additional cross-sectional dimension for reflecting variation in variables. 
Both the Levels and the Changes approaches are examined for suitabil ity 
in modeling the research propositions. Because the Levels technique is 
particularly sensitive to omitted variables, and the data avai lable may not capture 
al l the factors that effect local private employment, the results generated from the 
Changes model are arguably more meaningful . Furthermore, as discussed 
subsequently, only the Changes form of the model allows examination of 
proposition {2) . 
General Specification 
The general form of the model is EMPJt = f(DJt. Nt. MJt. IJJ , where EMPJt is 
non-farm private industry employment for county j, in time t; DJt is local defense 
employment characteristics; Nt represents national level economic influences; 
MJt includes migration determinants; and IJt is industry location factors. DJt is 
comprised of the primary variables of interest in the study, while NJt• MJt• and IJt 
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make up the control variables. Consistent with the public finance literature, DJt is 
held to be exogenously determined .23 
Beginning with the Levels modeling approach, define long run equilibrium 
private employment, EMPJ1* , to be a function of D and C: 
(1 ) 
Again, DJt is the vector of characteristics related to defense installations 
and their labor forces; CJt = I(Nt. MJt. IJJ .  
The baseline model incorporates a dynamic specification whereby actual 
regional employment, EMPJt is a function of long run equilibrium employment 
EMP/ and lagged employment, EMPJ.t-l · The lagged dependent variable is 
consistent with Finkel (1 995), because the present state of regional employment 
is believed to be determined in part by the past state, rather than "created anew." 
It also supports the desired partial adjustment setting and wil l provide some 
gauge of regional size in the Changes model . In Levels form, the dynamic 
model, then, is: 
(2) 
23 See discussion of military bases in an 1-0 and economic base framework, beginning on page 
(continued on next page) 
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Substitution of (1 ) in (2) yields: 
(3) 
This is the classical  form of the general model to be estimated. It is 
possible the disturbance may be time and/or region sensitive. Assuming the 
disturbance is dependent in part on both dimensions, the three error component 
(two-way) specification of the error term will accommodate this view: 
Ejt = Ut + Vj + Wjt (4) 
Substitution of (4) into (3) yields: 
EMPjt = Af3'Djt + A:y'Cjt + ( 1 - A.)EMPjt-1 + Ut + Vj + Wjt (5) 
This is the random effects form of the general model to be estimated . The 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, as described in Kmenta (1 997), is used 
to test the hypothesis H0: cru
2 
= crv2 = 0, in which case the model in (5) defaults 
back to the classical model in (3) as the appropriate choice of the two. 
Should the null hypothesis be rejected, it is still possible that (5) is not the 
appropriate specification. Specifically, it may be the case that one or more of the 
33, and Mueller (1 996}. 
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explanatory variables in CJt or DJt is correlated with Ut and/or �· For example, \j 
captures al l the region related error - both true error, and error attributable to 
unobserved or unmeasured region unique factors . Suppose cl imate - a 
characteristic unique to regions, but relatively constant over time - is one of 
those unmeasured factors, and population is one of the explanatory variables. 
Intuitively, population is correlated with climate, but climate is omitted from the 
model, so the estimates will be biased and inconsistent. A region dummy 
variable can be used to capture the combined influence of climate and other 
unobserved region specific and time-invariant characteristics . The effects of 
these unobserved factors are then estimated as parameters rather than being 
rolled into the error terms. A parallel solution applies to unobserved factors that 
differ across time, but remain constant across regions . 
Allowing for the consideration of time and region specific fixed effects, the 
model in (3) can be expressed as: 
(6) 
Equation (6) is the fixed effects variation of the model estimated.24 At is 
used to capture unobserved/unmeasured region-invariant fixed effects, while "'PJ 
captures the unobserved/unmeasured time-invariant fixed effects. 
24 Equation {6) assumes both region and period fixed effects. It is also possible that fixed effects 
prevail only across regions, or only across time, rather than both . In either case, a two error 
component hybrid of equations {5) and {6) is appropriate. 
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Assuming the null hypothesis for the model in (5) is rejected - ruling out 
the classical model in (3) - the Hausman test, as described in Greene (2000), 
facil itates testing for correlation between the explanatory variables and the error 
terms. If a relationship exists, the fixed effects model described by equation (6) 
is the appropriate specification. If the correlation is not significantly different from 
0, the random effects model presented in (5) is appropriate. 
Should the Hausman test point to the random effects model as the 
• appropriate specification, inherent d ifficulties with the lagged dependent variable 
have to be addressed . Specifically, as i l lustrated in equation (5), EMPJt is a 
function of VJ and EMPJ,t-1 · But this means EMPJ,t-1 is a lso a function of vJt which is 
a violation of the least squares assumption that right side variables are 
independent of the error term. Instrumental variable techniques are typically 
necessary to preclude the biased estimates that result. For example, under the 
Changes model, techniques suggested by Baltagi (1 995) and Anderson and 
Hsiao (1 981 ) are applied . Specifically, (EMPJ,t-2 - EMPJ.t-3) and EMPJ,t-2 are 
examined for suitabi lity as instruments for (EMPJ,t-1 - EMPJ.t-2) . 
Equations (1 ) through (6) may be converted to the Changes format simply 
by taking the first differences. To i l lustrate, the Changes general form of the 
random effects model in (5) is: 
EMPJt - EMPJ.t-1 = 
A.P'(DJt - DJ.t-1) + A.y' (CJt - CJ,t-1) 
+ ( 1  - A.) (EMPJt-1 - EMPJ,t-2) + (ut - Ut-1) + (vJ - VJ) + (WJt - WJ,t-1) 
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(7) 
Note that the region related component of the error term, (vJ - v� , reduces 
to 0, thereby dropping out of the model . 
Explanatory Variables and Expected Relationships 
Given DJt is the vector of observed characteristics of defense installations 
and their labor forces, the variables chosen to reflect these characteristics in the 
Levels form of the model are listed in Table 1 .  
DEFJt is self-explanatory. As proxy for BRAC facil ities reuse, LANDJt is an 
approximation of actual installation land reuse. It is based on the total acreage 
"excessed" as of November 2000, allocated across time in proportion to base 
personnel losses following the corresponding BRAC round . 
Referring back to equations (6) or (7), CJt is the vector of observed 
characteristics which impact regional employment, other than local mil itary 
presence. More specifically, CJt = f(N., MJt• IJJ represents the underlying 
economic environment in which the exogenous mil itary shocks perform. Failure 
Table 1 - Defense Related Variables 
Variable Definition 
Military and defense federal civilian employment. 
Proxy for cumulative BRAC facil ities reuse, measured in acres 
(i.e. , LANDt + LANDt-t + LANDt-2 + . . . ) . 
Notes: 1 .  Measures are at the county level 
2 .  j denotes county j 
3. t denotes year t 
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to adequately consider these control factors may lead to omitted variable bias in 
the results of the analysis. 25 
Regarding the national level control variables, Nt. a number of possibi lities 
exist for capturing these effects. For example, Hamilton (1 983) finds compell ing 
evidence that crude oil price shocks are correlated with, and possibly precursors 
to U .S .  recessions. Specifically, for the period 1 945-1 981 , seven of the eight 
post-war recessions were preceded by significant increases in the price of oil 
(typically a JA year lag), yet the case for coincidence or a causal rmtionship 
between another endogenous factor and both happenings is not evident. Hooker 
and Knetter (1 997) find added support for the use of oil prices as macroeconomic 
control variables. But, given the economic inertia at the national level, perhaps 
the most appropriate approach is to control for these influences through the use 
of period dummy variables (a period fixed effects specification) . It may be 
difficult to argue that other proxies or combinations of measures offer a more 
comprehensive representation of national factors. 
The effects of crude oil prices evidenced in Hamilton's work, and that of 
Keane (1 993) , suggest oil related factors may have a role elsewhere in the 
model . Specifically, state-level composite energy prices, which are highly 
correlated with crude oil prices, may be useful proxies of relative l iving and 
production costs. Hence, this explanatory variable has potential in the modeling 
25 As noted by Bartik (1 991 ) , the ftChanges" form of the model offers some relief to this condition. 
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of both migration and industry location factors. I n  either case, the expected 
relationship with regional employment is negative . 
The vector of control variables, CJt• is also comprised of migration 
determinants, MJt· A common theme in regional studies is that employment 
opportunity and amenities are significant determinants of migration. For example, 
Greenwood (1 969) finds unemployment rates at the origin are a significant factor 
in the decision to migrate. Schlottmann and Herzog (1 982) find the probability of 
outmigration increases with the population-employment pressure index.26 Knapp 
and Graves (1 989) sketch theoretical frameworks that have roles for location 
specific amenities under both supply and demand driven migration and regional 
development models. Other empirical works (e.g. ,  Herzog and 
Schlottmann, 1 986; Clark and Knapp, 1 995) further reinforce the importance of 
d isamenity and quality of l ife considerations, and employment opportunities in the 
migration decision. As such, a lagged population pressure index is included .27 
This variable serves as a proxy for employment potential and economic 
assistance. Ceteris paribus, h igher ratios for past index va lues signal unfilled 
demand, a ripe labor market, and possibly the need for jobs programs and other 
public assistance in the current period . The expectation is that regional 
employment increases with the lagged value of the population-to-employment 
ratio . At first glance, this may seem contrary to results of Schlottmann and 
26 The population-employment pressure index is defined as those who can work divided by those 
who do work (i.e., population 1 4  years of age or older over total employment} . 
27 The population pressure index used in this study is defined as total population divided by total 
employment. 
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Herzog (1 982) . But the two ideas can be reconciled. Specifically, h igher 
population-employment pressure indices in the current period indicate e ither 
labor force partic ipation is low, or unemployment is high. I n  the latter case, the 
immediate response may be an increased propensity to migrate out, as 
Schlottmann and Herzog suggest. This offers some relief to the population 
pressure index via a reduction in the numerator. But, from the supply side, h igh 
index values - whether due to lower participation or higher unemployment - a lso 
characterize untapped labor, and may even signa l planners and government 
officials that assistance is required. The resulting downstream attention acts as a 
counterforce, generating jobs and increasing the denominator of the index. As 
the lagged index decreases in value, this effect diminishes . To assume the 
opposite (i .e., that employment decreases as the lagged population pressure 
index increases) might suggest depressed areas generally stagnate, and then 
wither away. While there is a wealth of evidence to support the idea of regional 
employment cycles, actual instances of modern ghost towns are few and far 
between.  
As discussed previously, Dalen berg, et. al .  ( 1  998) find public goods 
expenditures are positively related to employment. Since employment 
opportunities influence the migration decision, the model incorporates a variable 
to capture this effect. Specifically, state and local government employment is 
used as a proxy for regional public goods expenditures. Intuitively, the former 
should be a good substitute for the latter as the two are general ly highly 
correlated . 
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While most agree transfer payments offer no benefits in the form of 
macroeconomic growth, some may argue the resulting increased spending has 
induced employment effects at the local levels, where payments are received . 
However, transfer payments are also indicative of loca l economic conditions and, 
perhaps, the state of the local labor force. In this model, it is assumed the latter 
negative relationship outweighs the former positive effects of induced 
employment, such that income maintenance benefit payments are considered a 
disamenity with respect to the migration decision. The model captures the effect 
of this disamenity on migration, and hence employment, in the form of a lagged 
per capita income ma intenance benefit payments variable. 
The intangible amenities side of migration determinants may be modeled 
through regional dummy variables. In modeling county level growth, Carlino and 
Mills (1 987), find Census region dummies serve as good proxies for important 
regional amenities. However, prel iminary tests reveal group fixed effects, or 
county level dummies add more power to the models that follow despite the 
resulting loss in degrees of freedom. Accordingly, county level dummy variables 
are examined against the random effects model form to evaluate their overal l  
suitability in capturing the effects of unobservable amenities. 
Finally, the vector of control variables, CJt• includes industry location 
factors, IJt· The literature is fairly consistent in the idea that investment in human 
capital, or education, exacts a positive influence on industry location, and hence 
economic growth. For example, Wasylenko and McGuire ( 1 985) find education 
expenditures have a significant positive relationship with employment in the retai l  
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trade and finance industries, and overal l  state employment. Plaut and Pluta 
(1 983) report education expenditures are a significant determinant of 
manufacturing employment growth. According to Helms' 1 985 panel data study, 
state revenues applied to public education programs enhance state output. 
Recognizing that wages are highly correlated with education levels, a lagged 
private wage rate variable is included as a proxy of regional education levels . 
Per capita federal education assistance is also used to reflect improvements to 
local human capital .  Both capture education's role in industry location, and 
hence employment growth . G iven education's potential at improving individual 
earnings and wel l  being, it is conceivable to think of these factors as favorable 
migration determinants as well .  
Keeping with conventional thought, and Blomquist's (1 988) specification of 
the indirect util ity function for households in his study of industry location under 
cost minimization and household utility maximization criteria, household util ity is 
inversely related to land rents within the region. Under monocentric models of 
land rents (see Muth, 1 985), these rents can be expected to increase as one 
approaches the geographic urban center, or central business district. This 
stands to reason as population density increases in that direction and land 
becomes scarce. In that l ight, population density may be viewed as a disamenity 
in the migration decision . However, density is also ind icative of cultural, social , 
and recreational opportunities, which are typically regarded as amenities. So, 
with respect to migration determinants, the effect of population density is unclear. 
But as Smith (1 971 )  notes, large cities and metropolitan areas offer well-
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developed infrastructure, education institutions, services not available in smaller 
places, and agglomeration economies. Accordingly, urbanization, as reflected in 
population density is a favorable industry location factor. I n  this model, it is 
treated as such and this positive effect is assumed to outweigh the negative 
consequences of higher rents and congestion.  The lagged value of population 
per acre is the specific variable used. Its expected positive relationship with 
employment is congruent with the results of Herzog's and Schlottmann's 1 993 
study which finds that for most metropol itan areas (i .e . ,  those below 4.4 million in 
population) , population functions as a net-amenity. 
Regarding industry structure, examination of Figure 4 reveals a consistent 
trend in the manufacturing and service industry sectors during the sample period. 
Specifically, as a percentage of total U .S .  employment, manufacturing has 
sharply declined over these twenty years while the service industry has boomed. 
As such, the set of industry location control variables includes variables that 
capitalize on this obvious structural shift. In the spirit of shift-share analysis, 
regional employment growth related to the industry mix effect is captured through 
variables that reflect the region's industry structure for the preceding period . 
Variables depicting relative industry representation (e.g . ,  EMPuiEMPJ) are wel l  
suited for this role. Of course, for the n industries comprising the structure being 
modeled, only n-1 such variables can be used or they will a l l  sum to one, 
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Figure 4 - Industry Employment Composition 
The nominal levels of industry employment i l lustrated in Figure 5 provide 
some insight into the appropriate choice for the industry structure variables. 
Though manufacturing has radically dropped as a percent of U .S. employment, 
growth-wise it has only declined 3 .5  percent during this same period . On the 
other hand, services has grown 1 20 percent while the remaining non-farm private 
sectors have more or less moved together, growing 53 percent when viewed in 
aggregate. Therefore, lagged values of percent services and percent other 
private employment (i .e., aggregate non-farm private employment other than 
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Economic base theory suggests resilience to exogenous regional shocks 
may be determined in part by the community's degree of industry specialization. 
Specifically, the more specialized a county becomes, the more likely it is 
producing for demands beyond its own internal consumption . As this ratio of 
basic to nonbasic industry grows, the effects of exogenous shocks such as local 
military draw downs and base closures are Jess pronounced. For example, 
defense workers stationed in a county that is highly special ized in agriculture 
may have to satisfy a greater portion of their consumer demands through imports 
(e.g . ,  catalogs, mail order, shopping excursions, etc.) .  When these workers 
depart, the loss of this consumption has little or no effect on the host community. 
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Of course this dampening effect applies in the case of defense buildups as well .  
To model this effect, a lagged coefficient of specialization variable is interacted 
with the defense personnel variables in an appended variation of the Changes 
model . The expectation is that increased specialization reduces the effect of the 
primary defense variables. The coefficient of specialization is a lso included as a 
stand-alone variable to preclude erroneous acceptance of the interaction term as 
significant if the specialization coefficient alone is in fact carrying the explanatory 
weight. The Levels model does not include a coefficient of specialization 
interaction term, as this term cannot be l itera lly transformed to a Changes form 
with any economic meaning. It does, however, contain a stand-alone industry 
specialization variable, because even by itself it is expected to have a role in 
determining regional employment growth. Specifically, the coefficient of 
specialization is expected to have a negative relationship with employment; as 
industry composition becomes more specialized, employment growth is retarded . 
The thought here is that much l ike a stock portfolio, over time the diverse 
regional structures are subject to less industry specific risk, and therefore rea lize 
more stable growth patterns.28 
Finally, IJt would not be complete without consideration of the exogenously 
determined factor, farm employment. Like defense, the bulk of demand for this 
industry's output originates from beyond county lines. Though the purpose of 
this study is to examine defense employment effects on local communities, 
28 Much work has been done in this area. For instance, see Kurre and Woodruff III (1 995). 
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fai lure to consider farm employment would probably result in omitted variable 
bias; particularly since positive indirect and induced employment relationships 
are expected between farm employment and private employment. The specific 
variables incorporated in the CJt vector of control variables for the Levels model 
are summarized in Table 2 .  
Algebraical ly, the preliminary specification of the model in Levels, random 
effects form is reflected in equation (8) . Expected signs are given . 
EMPJt = a  (8) 
+ A�1DEFJt A�1 > 0  
+ A�zLANDJt A�2 > 0  
+ A'Y1STNRGYJ.t-1 A'Y1 < 0  
+ A )'zPPIJ,t-1 A'Y2 > 0  
+ A'YJSLGJt A'Y3 > 0  
+ AY.4PCIMBPJ,t-1 A'Y4 < 0  
+ A YsPWRJ,t-1 A'Ys > 0  
+ AysPCFEAJ.t-1 A'Y6 > 0  
+ A'YTDNSITYJ,t-1 A'Y7 > 0  
+ A'YaPSRVCJ,t-1 A'Ys > 0  
+ AygPOPEJ,t-1 A'Y9 > 0  
+ A Y10CSJ.t-1 A'Y10 < 0 
+ AyuFARMJt A'Yu > 0  
+ (1-A)EMPJ.t-1 ( 1-A) > 0 
+ Ut + Vj + Wjt 
Note that this initial specification facilitates testing of propositions (1 ) and 
(3) . Specifically, proposition (3) holds that mil itary base reuti l ization efforts create 
local employment. Since LAND is the proxy for cumulative facil ities reuse under 
BRAC, this is modeled in the expectation that aEMP/aLAND = A�z > 0. The 
expectation that aEMP/aDEF = A�1 > 0, appears to say defense workforce levels 
exhibit a positive relationship with local employment. Congruent with 
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Table 2 - Levels Model Control Variables 
Variable Definition 
STNRGYJ.t-1 State level composite cost of energy ($/million BTU); proxy for 
relative cost of living/cost of production; lagged one period . 
PPIJ,t-1 Population Pressure Index (population/non-farm private 
employment); lagged one period. 
SLGJt State and Local Government employment in year t .  
PCIMBPJ.t-1 Per Capita Income Maintenance Benefit Payments; lagged one 
period . 
PW�.t-1 Private Wage Rate (private industry earnings/private industry 
employment) ; ($000); proxy for workforce skills/education level ;  
lagged one period. 
PCFEAJ.t-1 Per Capita Federal Education Assistance ($000) ; lagged one 
period. 
DNSITYJ.t-1 Population density (population/acres); lagged one period . 
PSRVCJ.t-1 Percent services industry employment (service SIC 
employment/employment for private, non-farm SICs) ;  lagged one 
period . 
POPEJ.t-1 Percent other private industry employment (employment for 
private, non-farm industry SICs excluding services and 
manufacturing/employment for private, non-farm SICs); lagged 
one period. 
CSJ.t-1 Coefficient of Industry Specialization, lagged one period: ( 1  n EMP EMP US ) - ""'  \J.t-1 I ,H 0 < CS < 1 £..J us ' - � t-1 -2 1=1 EMPJ,t-1 EMPH . 
FARMJt Employment for farming SIC in year t. 
Notes: 1 .  Measures are at the county level unless otherwise stated 
2 .  i denotes industry i 
3. j denotes county j 
4. t denotes year t 
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conventional wisdom regarding employment multipliers, this anticipated outcome 
supports proposition (1 ) ;  the idea that increases in  base labor spur positive 
indirect employment effects. However, in consideration of proposition (2), which 
states decreases in base employment generally exert a positive indirect effect as 
wel l ,  the anticipated direction of A.�, really says the positive effects of defense 
labor increases outweigh the asymmetrical, or negative effects of defense labor 
decreases. Because the Levels model form does not permit decomposition of 
these countervail ing effects, DEF is expected to test insignificant in one or more 
of the Levels model variations. But the Levels model represents only a baseline. 
Its conversion to a Changes form presents modeling solutions to this concern 
and the issue of instrumental variable selection for the lagged dependent 
variable, private employment (EMPJ.t-t) . The Changes form is used to examine 
propositions (4) and (5) . 
Data Collection and Adjustments 
The observations for this study are compiled from a variety of sources into 
one panel data set spanning 20 years (1 978-1 997) and 3,092 counties. Virtually 
every U .S. county for the 50 United States, plus Washington DC, is included in 
the set. The only regions excluded are portions of Alaska that account for 20% 
of its population. Numerous boundary redefin itions for these areas between 
1 978 and 1 997 rendered related data unusable. The data set includes 61 ,840 
records. 
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Employment and Income 
Industry level employment and income figures (excluding military and 
defense civilians), as well as overall population values are from the BEA's 1 969-
1 998 Regional Economic Information System (REIS) CD ROM disk. RE IS 
employment figures estimates are largely by place of work. Income figures are 
place of residence and adjusted via the GOP deflator to 1 998 dollars. 
Military and Defense Civilian Personnel 
The REIS database cannot be used to obtain the necessary defense 
personnel figures for a number of reasons. First, defense civil ians are not 
reported as such; they are rolled up into the overall federal civil ian category. 
Second, the REIS military figures reflect both full-time active duty members, and 
part-time guard and reserve personnel. Because guard and reserve personnel 
generally work in that capacity only one weekend per month, and two weeks per 
year, place of work and place of residence often do not coincide for these 
members. As such, that portion of the military employment figure reflects 
aggregate data apportioned to the county level based on population . This 
creates a significant complication in the data since the guard and reserve 
represent 39 percent of the uniformed service members {1 999 figures) . F inally, 
examination of base reutilization impacts requires instal lation level figures so 
defense personnel in a given county can be identified to either ongoing 
operations, or discontinued operations, whichever the case may be. As it is, a 
number of counties host both types of installations. Since the lowest level of 
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aggregation for REIS data is county level, it is not possible to make this 
distinction using those figures. Consequently, military and defense civilian 
personnel figures for 1 977-1 999 are from the DoD Distribution of Personnel by 
State and by Selected Locations published annually by the Directorate for 
Information Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Services, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense . 
The DoD Distribution of Personnel figures are reported at the installation 
level, or by city in cases where personnel are stationed at a unit geographically 
separated from a base (e.g . ,  ROTC staffs, Defense Plant Representative Offices, 
recruiters, etc) . After making adjustments for known name changes, the number 
of stateside locations hosting defense personnel at any point over the 23 years 
sampled total 963. The majority of these figures were compiled manually as they 
were not available in electronic form.  Column-footing and cross-footing were · 
used to ensure accuracy of data transcription. Though data for additional years 
is available, manual transfer was deemed too time intensive given the reporting 
convention used prior to 1 977.  In either case, the selected interval al lows for 1 0  
years of data prior to the first BRAC, and 1 0  years subsequent to that round. 
The military and defense civilian personnel figures are reported as of fiscal 
year end (September 30, 1 9XX) . However, REIS figures are essential ly 
weighted average levels across the calendar year. Therefore, the DoD figures 
are adjusted to coincide with the REIS data .  Specifically, calendar year weighted 
averages were derived using the following formula: CYWAX2 = (9/32) x 
30SEPX1 + (22/32) x 30SEPX2 + (1 /32) x 30SEPX3, where CYWAX2 is 
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calendar year weighted average employment for year X2, and 30SE PXX is the 
reported defense employment level as of September 30th 1 9XX. 29 This results in 
the loss of two years of military personnel data : 1 977 and 1 999. The latter year 
is not a "real" loss since corresponding REIS data only covers employment, 
income, and military retiree data through 1 997 .  
The use of  detailed installation personnel data for al l  stateside mil itary 
sites addresses three limitations of earlier BRAC impact studies: (1 ) it facilitates a 
comprehensive review covering al l 50 states; (2) it factors in defense personnel 
dynamics of non-BRAC sites which share a county with a BRAC installation; and 
(3) it explicitly considers the time dimension for personnel flows out of the base, 
rather than assuming draw downs occurred en masse. Addressing the first 
l imitation helps to paint a whole picture and ensure robust results. However, 
addressing the latter two limitations is of greatest concern . Fai lure to consider 
net growth (net losses) for non-BRAC sites within BRAC counties will bias the 
multiplier estimates downward (upward). The potential for such bias is great 
given the 88 counties that were home to 97 major BRAC sites, were also home 
29 This approach assumes personnel increases/decreases occur on a straight-line basis from one 
measurement date to the next. Specifically, from SEPX1 to SEPX2, the average monthly change 
is (SEPX2-SEPX1 )/1 2. Similarly, from SEPX2 to SEPX3 the average monthly change is (SEPX3-
SEPX2)/1 2. On a straight-line basis, the level at JANX2 is then SEPX1 + 3[(SEPX2-SEPX1 )/1 2], 
or SEPX1 + (3/1 2)(SEPX2-SEPX1) .  For JANX3 it is SEPX2 + (3/1 2)(SEPX3-SEPX2) . From 
JANX2 to SEPX2 the monthly change is constant at (SEPX2-SEPX1 )/1 2, and from SEPX2 to 
JANX3 it is constant at (SEPX3-SEPX2)/1 2 .  Therefore, the weighted average personnel levels 
for calendar year 1 9X2 can be arrived at through the following formula: (9/1 2)[(JANX2 + 
SEPX2)/2] + (3/1 2)[(SEPX2 + JANX3)/2) = (9/24) (JANX2 + SEPX2) + (3/24)(SEPX2 + JANX3) . 
Substitution for JANX2 and JANX3 yields (9/24)[SEPX1 + (3/1 2)(SEPX2-SEPX1 ) + SEPX2] + 
(3/24)[SEPX2 + SEPX2 + 3/1 2(SEPX3-SEPX2)] = (9/24)(9/1 2SEPX1 +(1 5/1 2)SEPX2) + 
(3/24)[(21/1 2)SEPX2 + (3/1 2)SEPX3) = (81/288)SEPX1 + (1 35/288)SEPX2 + (63/288)SEPX2 + 
(9/288)SEPX3 = (9132)SEPX1 + (22132)SEPX2 + (1132)SEPX3. 
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to 1 95 other military facilities, which continued operations. The time dimension of 
personnel flows is important because under BRAC guidelines, the services are 
given up to six years to close a base. As such, the actual closure execution 
interval can vary from base to base. In fact, for BRAC '88 and BRAC '91 , closure 
intervals averaged just under 5- Y2 years , and just over 3 years, respectively 
(GAO, 1 998) .30 If personnel reductions are assumed to occur en masse on the 
official closure date when in fact they were evenly spread or loaded toward the 
front of the 6-year window (as is l ikely the case since the delays on most 
closures related to cleanup and reutil ization preparation, rather than personnel 
adjustments) , multiplier estimates may very well be biased downward. 
To give an idea of the magnitude and scope of stateside defense 
presence, the geographic distribution of defense personnel in 1 977 (the 
beginning of the data collection period) is presented in F igure 6 .  The areas 
experiencing the greatest losses of defense personnel across the subsequent 20 
years are il lustrated in Figure 7 .  
Base Realignment and Closure Classification 
Sources for BRAC data ( i .e . ,  bases selected for closure or reduction, and 
the year chosen) are the OEA webpage, the March 31 , 1 999 OEA Base 
Reutil ization Status Report, and the 1 996 CRS report, Military Base Closures 
Since 7 988: Status and Employment Changes at the Community and State 
30 Averages for the last two BRACs ('93 and '95) were not available in GAO's 1 998 report since at 
the time of publication six years had not yet lapsed under either closure round. 
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Figure 7 - Distribution of Defense Personnel Losses 
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Level. From this list of BRAC sites, bases are classified as major BRAC 
installations if the facility employed at least 300 military and defense civilians in 
1 987 or thereafter. This criteria closely paral lels the U .S.C.  Title 1 0  requirement 
for Congressional approval of restructuring actions that impact more than 1 ,000 
or half the resident federal workers at bases of 300 or more employees. A total 
of 97 installations are identified and classified as major BRAC facilities (see 
Appendix C) . The corresponding labor force is identified as BRAC related via a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of one beginning with the first post­
selection year these employment levels peaked. In most cases the "peak" was 
the year of selection. In some instances, post-BRAC base employment levels 
did not "peak" until 1 -3 years after the base's selection. Because these BRAC 
military and civil ian levels represent public infrastructure capacity that may come 
ava ilable for private reutil ization, it only makes sense to identify the workforce as 
such once the base begins its draw down, and thereafter. Initial ly, the distinction 
of BRAC related personnel reductions is used to apportion installation acreage 
reuse figures across the periods land transfers most likely occurred .31 This 
distinction is also beneficial later when the defense employment change variable 
is decomposed into its positive and negative components. 
After making the "BRAC" vs. "ongoing" distinction for defense personnel 
data, the figures are aggregated at the county level .  A tota l of 499 counties 
played host to the 963 mil itary facilities noted above - an average of nearly two 
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installations per military county. Of these 499 counties, four are dropped as part 
of the Alaskan areas for which consistent REIS data is not available over the 
sample period. Composed mostly of remote early ball istic missile warning and 
air defense activities, the mil itary presence associated with these four counties is 
relatively minor and does not include any of the major BRAC instal lations. 
Military Counties 
The corresponding counties for each of the 962 military locations are 
determined primarily through CD Light's ZIPiist5™ database on the lnternet.32 In 
many cases the station name is too narrow for this database, so an intermediate 
step of obtaining appl icable Z IP  codes through the US Postal Service is used . In 
some instances, Internet search sites, mapping software, and a Rand McNal ly 
Road Atlas are employed extensively to pinpoint the exact geographical location 
of the insta llation . 
Base Facil ities Reutil ization 
Variables representing facilities reutilization under BRAC are derived from 
personnel flows and base acreage data . Specifically, values of cumulative land 
areas declared excess by base, through November 2000, are from the O EA. 
These figures are spread over time in proportion to personnel outflow patterns at 
31 Detail regarding the periods in which actual land transfer transactions occurred was not 




the respective BRAC sites. Apportionment starts with the first year following 
BRAC selection in which base personnel levels were at their peak. While these 
are not precise measures, the combination of personnel flows and excessed 
acreage data should be fairly representative of the actual resources made 
available or anticipated to be available for private reuse. 
Oil and Energy Prices 
Oil and energy price data are from the Energy Information Administration 
(E tA),  U .S. Department of Energy. The energy figures (dollars per mi ll ion BTU's) 
are state-level values from the source data for the 1 997 EIA State Energy Price 
and Expenditure Report (SEPER) .  For consistency with income figures in the 




Random vs. Fixed Effects in the Levels Model 
The analysis begins with a comparison of the Levels model in equation (8) 
in its random effects and fixed effects forms (see page 61 ) .  Recall the only 
adjustment required to express (8) in the period and group fixed effects form is 
the addition of year and county dummy vectors, At and 'PJ, and replacement of 
Ut + VJ + WJt with the completely random error term, ejt· The relevant results are 
summarized in Table 3 and Table 4 .  
Keeping with Kmenta (1 997) ,  the LaGrange multiplier statistic i s  used to 
test if the random effects model is more appropriate than the OLS form. 
Specifically, the hypothesis is: 
Ho: <Tu 2 = <Tv 2 = 0 
HA: Ho is not true 
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Table 3 - Levels Model Results, OLS and Random Effects 
Dependent Variable: EMP1, 
OLS Random Effects 0 & t) 
Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
DEF1, 0.10 25.00 • •  0. 1 2  1 7. 1 0  • •  
LAND1, 0.79 1 1 .29 •• 0.64 9.09 •• 
STNRGYt.t- 1 8.62 1 .04 62. 1 9  3.52 • •  
PPI1.t-t 33.96 2.41 • 4.01 0.20 
SLG1, -0.02 -6. 1 6  • •  0.00 0.1 6 
PCIMBPt.t-t -1 .15 -1 1 .82 • •  -0.93 -5.98 •• 
PWRt.t-1 32.40 8.63 •• 1 2.30 2 .02 . 
PCFEA1.t-� -0.09 -0.21 1 .31 1 .98 . 
DNSITYt.t-� -0.20 -23.37 
•• -0. 1 8  -1 2.06 • •  
PSRVC1.1-1 1 734.76 8.20 • •  1 1 77.77 3.67 •• 
POPE1,t-1 466.03 3. 1 6  •• 552.49 2 .48 . 
CSt.t-t -1 201 .71 -6.59 •• -1 279.87 -4.49 •• 
FARM1, 0.27 20.65 • •  0.29 1 3.46 •• 






F-Stat = 5,703,579 
F (o.o5. 14, 58733) = 1 .70 
(counties, n = 3092; years, T = 19) 
t GLS estimation used in the random effects model does not produce a precise 
counterpart to R2• 
• Significant at the 95 percent level. 
•• Significant at the 99 percent level. 
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Table 4 - Levels Model Results, Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: EMPJt 
Region Fixed Effects 0) Period Fixed Effects (t) 2-Way Fixed Effects 0 & t) 
Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff 
�I not shown NA not shown 
At NA not shown not shown 
DEFtr -0.07 -2.08 • 0 . 1 0  25.18 • •  -0.06 
LANDJt 0.94 1 1 .97 • •  0.76 1 0.99 • •  0.91 
STNRGYJ,t-1 -82.79 -7.34 • • 94. 1 4  7.64 • •  4.65 
PPIJ,t-1 1 47.28 4.40 • •  33.36 2.38 . 76.51 
SLGtr -0.1 1 -7.54 •• -0.02 -6.35 •• -0. 1 0  
PCIMBP1.r-1 -0.50 -2.05 • -1 .28 -1 2.69 • •  -0.52 
PWR:!.r-1 73.21 1 1 .27 • •  25.22 5.62 • •  86.47 
PCFE�.t-1 3.24 2.92 •• 0.41 0.93 5 .98 
DNS11Yt.t-1 0.69 2 .74 •• -0.20 -23.55 •• 0.57 
PSRVCt.t-1 2291 .29 4 .19  •• 1 35 1 .41 6.1 1 • •  2 1 04.44 
POPF;,t-1 1 032.67 2.43 • 629.95 4.25 • •  649.26 
c�.t-1 -623.61 -1 .05 -1 1 43.25 -6.29 • •  -779.59 
FARMtt 0.22 3 .04 • •  0.26 20.41 • •  0.09 
EMP1.t-� 0.97 654.65 • •  1 .02 2840.64 •• 0 .97 
R2 = 0.999 R2 = 0.999 R2 = 
F-Stat = 30,61 5 F-Stat = 2,539,500 F-Stat = 
F (o.o5. 3105. 55642) = 1 .30 F (O.o5. 32, 58715) = 1 .45 F(o.o5, 3124. 55623) = 
(counties, n = 3092; years, T = 19) 
• Significant at the 95 percent level. 
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The test yields a statistic that far exceeds the critical value of c2, so the 
resulting conclusion is to accept the alternative hypothesis, HA. 33 Therefore, the 
classica l OLS model is not the appropriate choice for the data . 
Next, the Hausman test is used to evaluate the three error component (2-
way) random effects form against the combined period and group fixed effects 
model in Table 4 .  The test statistic, W, is  based on the Wald criterion.34 Once 
again, the computed value far exceeds the critical value of c2.35 It follows that 
the additional period and group error components of the random effects model 
are not orthogonal .  As a result, estimates under the random effects specification 
will not be consistent, so the fixed effect model becomes the appropriate choice 
of the two. 
The Hausman test is also performed on both 1 -way random effects model 
variations ( i .e. ,  period-only and region-only) . .  In both cases, the same outcome is 
real ized : the fixed effects forms are superior.36 This comes as no surprise -
particularly with respect to the region fixed effects model since the analysis is 
comprehensive rather than a random sampling of U .S. counties. Both Greene 
(2000) and Kmenta (1 997) hint at this eventua lity. With those two references and 
33 For the random effects model in Table 3, LM = 31 ,495. The 99.5 percent critical value of c2 
with two degrees of freedom, c22 = 1 0.66. 
34 Reference Greene (2000} . 
. 
35 For the 2-way random effects and fixed effects models, the value of W = 2,809. With 1 4  
degrees of freedom, the 99.5 percent critical value of d i s  31 . 
36 The W-statistic has a value of 2,875 for the region random effects vs. region fixed effects 
models, and a value of 40 for the period random effects vs. period fixed effects models. At the 
99.5% level, the critical value of c142 = 31 . 
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the test results above in mind, random effects (error components) specification 
forms are excluded from further consideration in this study. 
It is worth noting the choice of fixed effects models can be examined in 
another light. Specifical ly, as demonstrated by Greene (2000) , F statistics can 
be used to test the joint significance of period fixed effects and region fixed 
effects.37 In the case of period fixed effects, the F test results point to this model 
form over OLS.38 Further testing yields results that support the region fixed 
effects model over simple OLS.J9 F inally, in the presence of region fixed effects, 
the F test results suggest the combined period and region fixed effects model is 
the better choice.40 This choice comes at a considerable loss in terms of 
degrees of freedom (i .e . ,  one region dummy variable for each of 3,092 counties), 
but the sheer size of the data set more than accommodates. 
A few additional  observations can be made from results in Table 3 and 
Table 4 .  First, the large F-statistics suggest the models as a whole are 
significant. The explanatory power of al l  five models is a lso very high (R2 > 
0.99). Of course, this is to be expected with a lagged dependent variable on the 
37 For period fixed effects vs. OLS, the statistic is: [(R2u - R2r)l{n-1)]/[{1-R2u)/{nT - n - K)] .  The 
region fixed effects vs. OLS, the statistic is: [(R2u - R2r}l(f-l)]/[{1-R2u)/{nT - T - K)] .  For two-way 
vs. region-only fixed effects, the statistic is [(R2u - R2r)/(f-1)]/{(1-R2 u)/[{n-l) (f-1) - K)]} .  
38 From Table 3, R2 for the OLS form, R2r = 0.99927 . R2 for the unrestricted period fixed effects 
model, R2u, is 0.99928 {reference the second model in Table 4) . For the period-only fixed effects 
model, F-Stat = 58.90, and at the 95 percent level, F<18, 58714J ""  1 .6 1 .  This outcome favors the �eriod effects model over simple OLS. 
9 From Table 3, R2 for the OLS form, R2r = 0.99927. R2 for the unrestricted region fixed effects 
model, R2u, is 0.99942 {reference the first model in Table 4). For the region-only fixed effects 
model, F -Stat = 4 .62 . The critical value of F at the 95 percent level is F <3091• 55,641J "" 1 .30. This 
result supports a region fixed effects model over simple OLS. 
40 In this case, the restricted model is the region-on!� fixed effects one, while the unrestricted 
model is the region and period fixed effects form. R r = 0.99942 and R2 u = 0.99943. The result is 
(continued on next page) 
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right-hand side. Focusing only on the 2-way fixed effects model, a l l  of the control 
variables except state and local government employment (SLGJJ, and lagged 
state-level energy cost (STNRGYJ, t-1) have the expected signs. However, the 
latter, a long with PCIMBPJ,t-l r  POPEJ,t-1 • CSJ,t-1 • FARMJt are not significant. For the 
remaining four models, al l  but one or two of the variables are significant and most 
of the signs are as expected . I t  should also be noted that where applicable, the 
period and region dummy variables in these fixed effects models and all the ones 
that follow generally are significant, though the coefficients and T-statistics are 
not reported to save space. 
Between the five models of Table 3 and Table 4,  SLGJt and STNRGYj.t.1 
are least consistent with expectations. I n-depth comments about this outcome 
are deferred because these results represent only a rudimentary first look at 
modeling form. Suffice it to say the addition of Change variables that cannot be 
l iteral ly adapted from the Levels form, along with the results of the forthcoming 
Changes models, suggest these estimates probably suffer from modeling form 
error and omitted variable bias. 
All of the Levels model specifications imply the relationship between 
defense employment and local private employment must be either positive or 
negative; none of them a llow examination of both possibil ities (i .e. ,  asymmetrical 
relationships) . That said, of the two defense employment impact propositions, 
only the first (Proposition 1 )  can be examined . The OLS, random effects, and 
that F-Stat = 59.22. At the 95 percent level, F<,a. 55623) "" 1 .61 , so the two-way fixed effects model 
(continued on next page) 
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period-only fixed effects results support Proposition (1 ) since the signs of the 
defense employment variable, DEFJt. are positive and significant in these three 
models. Assuming asymmetrical employment effects exist, the net positive signs 
of the defense variables in these Levels models imply the positive effect of base 
employment increases overwhelm the inverse relationship of base employment 
decreases. If one expects the effect of job creation through build up to be more 
pronounced than that of job creation through destruction, this stands to reason. 
However, the overall negative (and significant) DEFJt coefficient in the region-only 
fixed effects model suggests just the opposite. Clearly, the decomposition of 
positive and negative defense personnel movements under the Changes model 
will shed l ight in this area . 
Final ly, the signs and significance of the installation reuti lization proxy, 
LANDJtt lend support for Proposition (3) . Specifically, in the two models on Table 
3 and the three on Table 4, the coefficients for LANDJt suggest that as base land 
and infrastructure is released to the community, local employment increases by a 
factor of between 0.64 and 0.94 jobs per acre. 
None of the Levels models address concerns over the lagged dependent 
variable's independence with respect to the error term. This oversight is by 
design because the next step in the process is to examine the Changes model, 
which offers a solution to this issue. Furthermore, by its very nature of first 
differencing, the Changes model eliminates concerns with region related random 
is superior. 
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or fixed effects, as the corresponding random error components or fixed dummy 
variables cancel out. With respect to the 2-way fixed effects Levels model, this 
translates to the recovery of the large loss in degrees of freedom discussed 
earlier. If an interim conclusion can be made, it's that the random effects model 
forms can be abandoned in the remaining analysis based on the desire to 
capture macroeconomic influences via period dummy control variables and the 
test results thus far. This decision is congruent with a priori reasoning regarding 
the sample type. Specifically, Greene (2000) suggests the region fixed effects 
form is reasonable where 1 00% population sampling of the cross-sectional data 
is involved and differences between the regions " . . .  can be viewed as parametric 
shifts of the regression function."  Baltagi (1 995) reinforces this notion, noting 
the fixed effects form is appropriate when inferences about the results are not 
intended to extend beyond the sample. For a l l  practical purposes, this study and 
the data fulfi l l  these criteria .  
Literal Transformation of the Levels Model to a Changes Form 
Notwithstanding the results of the Levels models above, the desire to 
decompose defense employment impacts into their positive and negative 
elements points to the Changes variation of the model in equation (8) as the 
stronger contender. The first difference specification form a lso helps in 
addressing concerns with instrumental variable selection for the lagged 
dependent variable. 
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First d ifferencing simply involves subtracting the previous period's value 
for a given variable, from the current period's value. For example, the dependent 
variable in the Changes model is defined as: 
EMPCHGJt = EMPJt - EMPJ,t-1 (9) 
Equation (1 O) reflects the literal Changes form for the 2-way fixed effects 
Levels version of the model in equation (8) . Definitions for the right-hand side 
variables in {1 0) are provided in Table 5 .  
EMPCHGJt = At - At-1 {10) 
+ 'Pj - 'Pj (= 0) 
+ A.�1DEFCHGJt A-�1 > 0  
+ A.�2LANDCHGJt A-�2 > 0  
+ A.y1STNRGYCHJ.1-1 A.y1 < 0  
+ A.y2PPICHGJ.t-1 A.y2 > 0  
+ A.YJSLGCHGJt A.y3 > 0  
+ A.y4PCIMBPCHJ,t-1 A.y4 < 0  
+ A.ysPWRCHGJ,t-1 A.ys > 0  
+ A.ysPCFEACHGJ,t-1 A.y6 > 0  
+ A.17DNSITYCHJ,t-1 A.y1 > 0  
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ,t-1 A.ys > 0  
+ A."(gPOPECHGJ.t-1 "Ay9 > 0  
+ A.y10CSCHGJ.t-1 AYIO < 0  
+ A.yuFARMCHGJt A'Yn > 0  
+ ( 1-A.)EMPCHGJ.t-1 ( 1-A.) > 0 
+ eJt 
With regard to the period dummy variables, the Changes model above 
presents some difficulties. Specifically, first differencing these dummies yields 
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Table 5 - Initial Changes Model Variables 
Variable Defin ition 
DEFCHG11 Change in military and defense federal civi lian employment, from year t-
1 to year t. 
LANDCHG11 Proxy for BRAC facil ities converted to reuse (acres) in year t. This 
figure is based on the actual area of land declared excess for non­
defense reutilization, spread over time in proportion to the draw down of 
personnel at the respective BRAC sites. 
STNRGYCHJ.t-1 State level change in the composite cost of energy, from t-2 to t-1 .  
PPICHGJ,t-1 Change in Population Pressure Index, from t-2 to t- 1 .  
SLGCHG1, State and Local Government employment, from t-1 to t.  
PCIMBPCHJ.t-1 Change in Per Capita Income Maintenance Benefit Payments, from t-2 
to t-1 .  
PWRCHG1.1•1 Change in Private Wage Rate, from t-2 to t-1 .  
PCFEACHGJ.t-t Change in Per Capita Federal Education Assistance, from t-2 to t- 1 .  
DNSITYCHJ.t-1 Change in population density, from t-2 to t-1 .  
PSRVCCHGJ.t-1 Change in percent service industry employment, from t-2 to t-1 .  
POPECHGJ,t-l Change in percent other private industry employment, from t-2 to t-1 .  
CSCHGJ.t-1 Change in the Coefficient of Industry Specialization; interaction variable 
for use with defense variables in the Changes model (see Table 2 for 
Coefficient of Industry Specialization computation) . 
FARMCHG1, Change in farming employment, from t-1 to t. 
EMPCHGJ.t-1 Lagged dependent variable (i.e. ,  change in  non-farm private 
employment, from t-2 to t-1) .  
Notes: 1 .  Measures are at the county level unless otherwise stated 
2. i denotes industry i 
3 .  j denotes county j 
4. t denotes year t 
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values of 1 if At = 1 (At - At-1 = 1 - 0 = 1 ), but it a lso yields values of -1 when At-1 = 
1 (At - At-1 = 0 - 1 = -1 ) .  Intuitively, this l iteral transformation has no meaningful 
economic interpretation. However, recognizing the intent is to control for 
macroeconomic influences in a given year, or changes in these factors from one 
year to the next, use of period dummies (At ) in the Changes model, rather than 
differences in these dummies (At - At_1 ) more appropriately addresses concerns 
with national level control variables. The first attempt at a Changes form of the 
Levels model is adjusted accordingly. This adjustment is the only deviation from 
the l iteral transformation of the Levels models already considered . The 
coefficient estimates for the transformed models are presented in Table 6. 
Results for the classical form appear first. The period-only fixed effects 
model is again evaluated against the OLS model through the F test. As with the 
Levels period-only fixed effects model, the F statistic exceeds the critica l value, 
so the period fixed effects form of the Changes model is superior to simple 
OLS.41 Region-only and two-way (period and region) fixed effects models are 
excluded from the l iteral Changes analysis. As discussed earlier and noted in 
equation (1 0), this is because under first differencing, time invariant region fixed 
effects, '¥J, drop out. 
When running the models in Table 6, the routine statistical output provides 
a Durbin-Watson value of 1 .877, which, being close to 2, h ints at rejecting the 
possibil ity of autocorrelation . But, as Gujarati (1 995) notes, in autoregressive 
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Table 6 - Literal Transformation of Levels Model to Changes Form 
Dependent Variable: EMPCHGu 
Period Fixed Effects (t) 
OLS Period Fixed Effects (t) (Autocorr. Corrected) 
Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
1u NA not shown not shown 
DEFCHG1t -0.22 -4.19 •• -0.21 -4.07 •• -0.21 -4.03 •• 
LANDCHG1t 2.37 1 1 .83 •• 2.31 1 1 .64 •• 2.30 1 1 . 1 8  •• 
STNRGYCHt.t-1 -242.1 2 - 1 5.96 •• -91 .57 -2.24 • -75.75 -1 .86 
PPICHGt.t-1 429.28 8.39 •• 346.72 6.75 •• 368.42 7.1 6 •• 
SLGCHG1t 1 .06 34.36 •• 1 .08 35.25 •• 1 .1 6  37 .32 •• 
PCIMBPCH1.t-1 1 .23 2.58 . -0.67 -1 .22 -0.67 -1 .21 
PWRCHG1.t-1 1 51 .35 9.40 •• 1 73.49 1 0.33 •• 1 74.34 1 0.39 •• 
PCFEACHGt.t·1 3.78 3.06 •• 3.63 2.88 •• 3.58 2.90 •• 
DNSITYCHt.t-1 951 3.47 1 5.80 •• 9030.98 1 5. 1 3  •• 9382.48 1 5 . 1 9  •• 
PSRVCCHG1.t-1 2693.29 3.51 •• 1 424.76 1 .85 1 41 4.40 1 .85 
POPECHGt.t-1 1 91 1 .04 3.24 •• 1 758.00 2.99 •• 1 821 . 1 4  3.1 2  •• 
CSCHG1.t-1 -3665.65 -4.25 •• -4749.1 7 -5.53 •• -4934.25 -5.78 •• 
FARMCHG11 1 . 1 3  1 0.60 •• 1 . 1 3  1 0.34 •• 1 .1 3  1 0.39 •• 
EMPCHGt.t-1 639.75 203.87 •• 641 .37 205.48 •• 61 2.99 1 91 .04 •• 
Final est. of Rho NA NA 0.08 20.64 •• 
R2 = 0.531 R2 = 0.540 R2 = t 
F-Stat = 4,743 F-Stat = 2,1 53 F-Stat = t 
F (0.05. 14. 58733! = 1 .70 F(o.05. 32. 58715) = 1 .45 F (0.05, 32. s8715l = t 
(counties, n = 3092; years, T = 19) 
t Results are based on transformed data (i.e .• y•j1 = (1 - p 2) 11�11: y*Jt - PYJ.t-1 • for t =  2 to T; and similarly for 
x*JJ, so these statistics are not meaningful. 
• Significant at the 95 percent level. 
•• Significant at the 99 percent level. 
41 In this case, R2 u =0.54; R2, = 0.53; n = 3,092; T = 19; K = 1 5. The computed F statistic, F-Stat = 
66.09. At the 95 percent level, F (1B, ssJ1 41 "" 1 .61 . 
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models l ike this partial adjustment one, there is an integra l bias toward 
overlooking serial correlation in the D-W statistic. Durbin's M test is suggested 
as an a lternative.42 Test results indicate the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected .43 However, as suggested in Kmenta (1 997), 
wrongly assuming the disturbances are independent is much more damaging 
than allowing for autoregression that may not be present. I n  that l ight, the third 
model in Table 6, and all remaining models in this study are corrected for first 
order autocorrelation via the Prais-Winsten iterative method. Under this 
transformation technique, as outlined in Kmenta (1 997), none of the observations 
are lost. The first estimate of p, p is approximated from the D-W statistic, d, 
such that p = 1 - Y:zd, in accordance with Greene . 44 Only one iteration is 
required and the final estimate of rho, p = 0.085. 
For al l  the control variables in the two period fixed effects models of Table 
6, the signs of the coefficients are exactly as expected. Contrasting the 2-way 
fixed effects Levels model with the AR(1 ) corrected, period-fixed effects Changes 
model, the transformation seems to have righted the signs for the effects of state 
and local government programs (SLGCHGJJ and state-level energy costs 
(STNRGYCHJ,t-1) . The latter continues to be insignificant, as does the income 
42 The procedure, as adapted from Gujarati (1 995) involves a two step process: (1 ) Obtain the 
estimated error terms, �� from an OLS regression of the original model; (2} Regress the � on the 
original regressors, plus the lagged value of the estimated error term, �-t · The resulting value of 
R2 is then multiplied by (n - p) to produce the M statistic, which approximates c/ ( p is used to 
denote the level of serial correlation; e.g., p = 1 reflects a 1st order autoregressive scheme). 
43 M = (n - p} x R2 = (1 9-1 ) x 0.01 5 = 0.26. At the 95% level, the critical value of c1 2 is 3.84. 
Since c1 2 > M, H0: p = 0 cannot be rejected. 
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maintenance benefit payments variable (PCIMBPCHJ,t-1 ) .  The percent other 
private employment (POPECHGJ.t-1), coefficient of specialization (CSCHGJ,t-1) ,  and 
farm employment (FARMCHGJJ change variables all become s ignificant in the 
Changes model. In fact, regarding expectations, the only adverse change 
between the two models is the percent services employment variable loses its 
significance in the period-fixed effects, Changes AR(1 ) model . 
Looking at the primary variables of interest, the defense instal lation 
reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJJ is positive and highly significant, lending support 
to Proposition (3) . Interestingly DEFCHGJt• though significant, is opposite in sign 
from what most would expect. The negative coefficient seems to suggest that 
increases in defense employment lead to decreases in local private employment. 
This is l ikely due to specification error that can be resolved through the 
decomposition of defense personnel changes into negative and positive 
elements. Decomposition is explored fol lowing the discussions on defense 
county dummy variables, and lagged dependent variable instruments. 
Defense County Dummy Variables 
Since the time Spanish explorers and English settlers colonized America, 
to the early 1 900s, the need to protect vital ports and trade routes drove 
domestic mil itary location and fortification strategies. But involvement in two 
world wars and changes in technology - most notably, the abi lity to project power 
44 Reference Greene (2000), equation (1 3-26), page 538, and related discussion on page 546. 
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quickly and en masse - altered this causal relationship. By the mid-1 950s, 
military instal lation location drove transportation infrastructure development. In 
fact, a major justification for the Federal Aid-H ighway Act of 1 956, which initiated 
construction of 41 ,000 miles of interstate highways, was the support of rapid and 
large-scale troop mobi l ization (Cox, 1 996) . Combined with the boom in 
automobile ownership, this nodal transportation network made America the 
mobile society it is today. Not surprisingly, economic studies give recognition to 
the link between public highway spending and regional employment growth (e.g . ,  
Dalenberg, et.al . ,  1 998; Fox and Murray, 1 991 ) .  
In either of the above instances - bases fol lowing trade routes, or 
highways and rai lways accommodating bases - it is fair to assume military 
installations are indicators of regions characterized by greater than average 
growth potential .  The effect of this growth rate differential can be captured 
through an instal lation age variable in the Levels model . I ntuitively, the 
expectation is that the longer an installation is in place, the higher the expected 
level of employment attributable to the accompanying transportation network. 
However, the data set at hand does not include instal lation age information. 
Fortunately, the Changes model presents an opportunity to bypass this 
shortcoming. Recognizing the Changes model simply involves first differencing, 
the resulting installation age differences will a lways take a value of one, even if 
the actual age is unknown. In other words, under the Changes model, dummy 
variables used to identify counties with a defense presence are the l iteral 
equivalent of installation age variables in the Levels model . 
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Defense county dummy variables serve another purpose as wel l :  they 
capture the effect of mil itary retiree location trends. Specifical ly, there is a 
propensity for mil itary retirees to establish residence near DoD bases. In 
essence, the variety of benefits available through military installations (e.g . ,  
medical, legal, chaplain services, tax-free retai l shopping, etc.) plus the fertile 
market for mil itary skills and experience exacts a "magnetic pull" on retiring 
members when they select their next community of residence. Dardia's 1 995 
study of BRAC impacts in California, and the 1 998 GAO review of prior BRAC 
rounds give recognition to this phenomenon. This location trend translates to 
additional induced employment effects for counties with a defense presence. 
Accordingly, the l itera l Changes model is appended to include defense county 
dummies (DEFDVJ) as proxies for developed transportation infrastructure and the 
"retiree effect." The results are presented in Table 7 .  
Inclusion of defense county dummy variables has no effect on the signs or 
significance of the parameter estimates, with the exception of lagged change in 
state energy cost (STNRGYCHJ,t-t) , which becomes significant in this model 
variation . The defense personnel change variable (DEFCHGJJ is highly 
significant and its magnitude decreases by 24 percent, but it is stil l  negative. As 
expected, the defense county dummy variable (DEFDVJ) is positive, and highly 
significant. Disregarding lagged dependent variable and defense decomposition 
issues, the estimated value for DEFDVJ suggests 751 jobs per year are 
attributable to relatively better developed highway, rai l ,  air, and sea 
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Table 7 - Changes Model with 
Defense County Dummy Variable 

















Final est. of Rho 
Period Fixed Effects (t) 
Corrected for Autocorrelation 
Coeff T-Stat 
not shown 
-0. 1 6  -3.09 •• 
750.89 20.82 •• 
2.1 0 1 0.22 •• 
-85.19 -2. 1 0 . 
355.09 6.93 •• 
1 .1 1  35 .71  •• 
-0.61 - 1 . 1 1 
1 45.66 8.68 •• 
3.23 2.62 •• 
9340.41 1 5. 1 4  •• 
909.40 1 . 1 9  
1 604.57 2.76 •• 
-458 1 .1 8 -5.38 •• 
1 . 1 4  1 0.48 •• 
0.60 1 84.39 •• 
0.09 22. 1 4  •• 
(counties, n = 3092; periods, T = 19) 
• Significant at the 95 percent level. 
•• Significant at the 99 percent level. 
Note: Model corrected for first order autocorrelation. 
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transportation networks, a long with induced effects of retiree convergence, in 
defense counties . 
Instruments for the Lagged Dependent Variable 
Suppose for a moment the disturbance term is not completely random, but 
rather takes the form EJt = Ut + vJ + WJt• or EJt = vJ + WJt· As noted at the outset, 
complications arise in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Specifically, 
in either case, under the Levels model, EMPJt is a function of vJ and EMPJ,t-1 . But 
this means EMPJ,t-1 is also a function of vJo This violation of the least squares 
assumption that right side variables are independent of the error term results in 
biased estimates. First d ifferencing under the Changes model appears to 
alleviate this concern as vJ drops out (i .e . ,  vJ - VJ = 0) . This is exactly the first step 
in remedies suggested by Baltagi (1 995) and others. As it is, this step has 
a lready been taken, even though preliminary test results point toward the fixed 
effects specifications over the random effects ones, suggesting the disturbance 
term does not contain either period or region components. But concerns with the 
lagged dependent variable do not end here. 
While much of the l iterature is concerned with lagged dependent variable 
problems in the random effects models only, Greene (2000) , and Arel lano and 
Honore (1 999) note difficulties may exist in the fixed effects form as wel l .  
Specifica l ly, EMPJ,t-1 is correlated with 'PJ by design in the Levels region (or region 
and period) fixed effects model . Additional ly, EMPJ,t-1 is correlated with EJt• even 
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under the assumption that EJt is not serially correlated. First differencing to the 
Changes form removes the heterogeneity, but as seen in equation (1 1 ), a 
correlation problem between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbance 
still exists. 
EMPCHGJt = 
EMPJt - EMPJ.t-1 = � '  (XJt - XJ,t-1) + y' (EMPJ,t-1 - EMPJ,t-2) + (EJt - EJ,t-1) (1 1 )  
The recommended solution is to employ an instrumental variable for 
EMPCHGJ,t-1 · Baltagi (1 995) and Greene (2000) identify EMPCHGJ,t-2 (= EMPJ,t-2 -
EMPJ.t-3) , and EMPJ.t-2 as two viable contenders. As Kennedy (1 997) and Kmenta 
(1 997) caution, these instruments are not simply substituted for EMPCHGJ.t-1 · or 
they would function merely as proxies, yielding inconsistent estimates. I nstead, 
they are applied in the first step of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) routine, as 
described in Markus (1 979). The resulting fitted values are then substituted for 
EMPCHGJ.t-1 in the second step, producing coefficient estimates that are 
consistent and unbiased. As Kennedy (1 997) and Greene (2000) note, under 
instrumental variable estimation techniques, the variance-covariance matrix is 
larger than under simple OLS, so estimates may not be efficient. But, Kmenta 
(1 997) shows the degree of instrumental variable driven variance is inversely 
related to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the chosen 
instrument. U nder the circumstances, this compromise is deemed acceptable. 
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The model in equation (1 O) is appended using first EMPCHGJ,t-2• then EMPJ.t-2 as 
instrumental variables for EMPCHGJ.t-1 · The results are reported in Table 8 .  
Clearly, there is an appreciable difference in outcomes between the two 
instrumental variable choices. Specifically, in the second model of Table 8 
{where EMPJ.t-2 is the instrument), the signs for the defense county dummy 
variable (DEFDVJ). the lagged change in energy cost (STNRGYCHJ.t-1) , the 
change in state and local government employment (SLGCHGJJ, and the lagged 
change in population density (DNSITYCHJ.t-1) are opposite of both their expected 
signs and the results obtained when EMPCHGJ,t-2 is used as the instrument. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimate of 1 .31 for EMPJ.t-2 is counterintuitive given 
this represents 1-A (recall in a partial adjustment model, the value of A is 
constrained such that 0 � A �  1 ) .  
Examination of the correlation between these two instruments and the 
lagged dependent variable reveals EMPCHGJ,t-2 is the better choice. Specifically, 
neither instrument is contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance term, 
but rxy for EMPCHGJ.t-2 and EMPCHGJ,t-1 is 0.7 1 8, whereas the correlation 
coefficient for EMPJ,t-2 and EMPCHGJ.t-2 is 0.466. Keeping with Kmenta (1 997) 
then, the size of the variance-covariance matrix is minimized through the choice 
of EMPCHGJ.t-2· The larger variance under the EMPJ.t-2 instrument likely explains 
the disparities above. Consequently, through the remainder of the study, 
EMPCHGJ,t-2 serves as the instrumental variable remedy for lagged dependent 
variable concerns. 
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Table 8 - Changes Model with Lagged Dependent Variable Instruments 
Dependent Variable: EMPCHGJt 
EMPCHG*.J,t-t lnstrument: EMPCHG1,,_z EMPCHG*.t.t-t lnstrument: EMP1,1-2 
Coeff T-Stat 
& not shown & 
DEFCHG11 -0.21  -3 .79 • •  DEFCHG1, 
DEFDV1 1 741 .97 28.75 • •  DEFDVt 
LANDCHG11 1 .71  6.40 • •  LANDCHGit 
STNRGYCH1.t- 1 -35 .47 -0.88 STNRGYCHu-1 
PPICHG1.t-1 299.99 5 .73 • •  PPICHGt.t-1 
SLGCHG1, 1 .47 38.20 .. SLGCHG1, 
PCIMBPCHi.t-1 0.09 0. 1 7  PCIMBPCHt.t-1 
PWRCHGt.t-1 1 20.79 7 . 1 1 • •  PWRCHGt.t-1 
PCFEACHG1.t-1 3.08 2.67 •• PCFEACHGt.t-1 
DNSITYCHt.t-1 1 2356.80 1 5.54 • •  DNSITYCHt.t-1 
PSRVCCHG1.t-1 554.34 0.75 PSRVCCHGt.t-1 
POPECHGt,t-1 1 223.94 2 . 16  • POPECHGt.t-t 
CSCHGt.t-1 -3922.29 -4.63 • •  CSCHG1.t-1 
FARMCHG1, 0.89 8 .24 •• FARMCHG1, 
EMPCH(;t.t-2 0.26 40.60 • •  EMPt.t-2 
Final est. of Rho 0.52 1 45.90 • •  Final est. of Rho 
(counties, n = 3092; periods, T = 19) 
* Significant at the 95 percent level. 
•• Significant at the 99 percent level . 
Coeff T-Stat 
not shown 
-0.45 -8.51 • •  
-170 .00 -2.29 . 
1 .81 6 .90 •• 
38.92 1 .05 
1 304.00 25.61 • •  
-2 .52 -36.07 • •  
9 . 1 5 1 7 .1 4 • •  
45.99 2.92 . 
1 0. 1 1  9 .53 • •  
-9074.75 -1 0 .82 • •  
21 48.98 3. 1 3  • 
3009.45 5 .74 • •  
-1 1 221 . 20 - 1 4.1 9 • •  
1 .25 1 2 .45 • •  
1 .31  72 .35 • •  
0.56 1 65.54 • •  
Notes: 1 .  Observed values for the instruments EMPCHGJ.t-2 and EMPJ.t-2 represent the 
fitted values for EMPCHGJ.t-1 when it is regressed on the original independent 
variables and the respective instrument is substituted for EMPCHGJ,t-1 on the 
right-hand side (the equation and results when the instrument is EMPCHGj,t-2 is 
provided in Appendix B) . 
2. Models corrected for first order autocorrelation. 
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When compared with the Changes model before instruments (Table 7), 
the differences in results with EMPCHGJ.t-2 as the lagged dependent variable 
instrument are fairly minor. For example, the negative amenity proxy, lagged 
change in per capita income maintenance benefit payments (PCIMBPCHJ,t-1) is 
the only variable that reverses sign . But in both cases, this coefficient tests 
insignificant. The remaining variables have the expected signs in both models, 
with the exception of the primary variable of interest, DEFCHGJt· Again, its 
upcoming decomposition into positives and negative elements al lows closer 
scrutiny. Only the cost of living proxy, Jagged change in energy cost 
(STNRGYCHJ,t-1) , loses its significance moving from the lagged dependent 
variable model to the instrumental variable variation. F inal ly, the move to the 
instrumental variable model doubles the magnitude of the defense county effect. 
Decomposition of Personnel Changes and "Closure Clocks" 
Though model specifications thus far facilitate examination of Proposition 
(1 ), in principle, the counterintuitive results realized and Proposition (2) 
necessitate d issection , or decomposition of the defense personnel changes 
variable into its positive and negative elements. What's more, Proposition (3) 
can be better explored by dividing the negative personnel changes into two 
subcategories: those related to on-going defense operations, and those tied 
directly to base closures. The resulting three defense personnel change 






Table 9 - Decomposed Defense Variables 
Definition 
Positive changes (i .e . ,  increases) in military and defense 
federal civil ian employment from year t- 1 to year t. Observed 
values for this variable are always � 0 .  
Ordinary (non-BRAC related) negative changes in military 
and defense federal civilian employment from year t- 1 to 
year t. Observed values for this variable are always � 0. 
BRAC related changes in military and defense federal 
civilian employment from year t- 1 to year t. Nonzero values 
are reflected for this variable beginning the first year 
following the corresponding BRAC when levels begin to draw 
down, and thereafter. Observed values are a lways � 0 .  
Notes: 1 .  Measures are at the county level 
2. j denotes county j 
3. t denotes year t · 
Another noteworthy consideration is the effect of psychic shock associated 
with base closure selection and announcement. There is substantial anecdotal 
evidence of adverse reactions to these events. For example, Dardia et. a l .  
(1 995) contains a number of pessimistic forecasts developed by community 
leaders of effected areas in California. Kitfield (1 995) paints a bleak picture of 
San Antonio's shock over the announcement to close the depot at Kelly AFB. 
The Economist reports Sacramento's response to the selection of McClellan AFB 
is akin to rats leaving a sinking ship: "Many people are already trying to sell [their 
homes] before the flood of surplus houses h its the market."45 While there is no 
45 See "The McClellan Factor," 1 995. 
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widespread evidence to suggest closure communities on the whole faired poorly 
or dried up as anticipated, it is conceivable that businesses on the verge of 
starting up or locating in these communities at the time of announcement may 
have shared similar fears and delayed, or curta iled their plans. One way to 
capture this psychic shock effect is via a "closure clock" dummy variable regime. 
Specifically, a series of county-level dummies marking the year of base closure 
announcement, and the subsequent five years is examined.46 The purpose of 
these dummies is to capture the effects of unobservable BRAC factors such as 
community apprehension and optimism. Also embedded in these dummy 
variables is the effect of over one bi l lion dollars in BRAC related federal 
economic relief for which detai ls could not be obtained .47 Exploration of this 
dummy regime was deferred until this point since these variables cannot be 
strictly transformed between the Levels and Changes modeling forms without 
losing economic meaning. The "closure clock" dummies are defined in Table 1 0. 
A firm basis does not exist for detai led expectations of signs and 
magnitudes for each of these dummy variables; only relative general ities can be 
made. Assuming media descriptions accurately reflect community anxiety, 
negative coefficients are expected for the first few years. But, as anxiety gives 
way to less-than-disastrous real ity, and as community assistance arrives, these 
variables l ikely become less negative, or even positive where they capture 
46 Under base closure law, BRAG actions had to be completed within six years of a given base's 
selection. The TnJt dummy regime covers that interval .  
47 See discussion of Economic Relief, beginning on page 21 . 
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Variable 
Table 10 - BRAC "Closure Clock" Dummy Variables 
Definition 
Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if county j hosts a 
BRAC installation and t is the year this county first came 
under BRAC; otherwise Tjt = 0. 
Dummy variables {n = 1 to 5) which take a value of 1 if 
county j hosts a BRAC instal lation and t is the rih year after 
this county came under BRAC; otherwise Tlljt = 0. 
Notes: 1 .  j denotes county J 
2. t denotes year t 
reutil ization phenomena not reflected in the installation reutilization proxy, 
LANDCHGJt· 
Substituting PDEFCHGJt. NDEFCHGJt. and BDEFCHGJt for DEFCHGJt; 
adding the "closure clock" dummy regime; and employing EMPCHGJ,t-2 as the 
instrumental variable for EMPCHGJ,t-1 {denoted EMPCHG*J,t-1) yields the 
specification presented in equation {1 2) .  Results of the decomposed defense 
personnel changes model, with and without the "closure clock" dummy regime, 
are presented in Table 1 1  . 
With the exception of the BRAC related personnel change variable 
{BDEFCHGJ,j, the inclusion of a BRAC dummy regime does not appear to 
material ly affect the other variables when the two models of Table 1 1  are 
compared. The anticipated outcome for the "closure clock" variables is more or 
less real ized. Specifically, negative employment effects characterize the first 
year fol lowing announcement. This is in l ine with conjectures of community 
96 
EMPCHGJt = At  (12) 
+ A.B1aPDEFCHGJt A.B1a > 0  
+ A.B1bNDEFCHGJt A-B1b < 0  
+ A.B1cBDEFCHGJt A-Ble < 0  
+ A.BzDEFDVJ A.B2 > 0  
+ A.B3LANDCHGJt A.B3 > 0  
+ A.B4TOJt A.B4 ? 
+ A.B5T1Jt A.Bs ? 
+ A.BsT2Jt A.B6 ? 
+ A.B1T3Jt A-B1 ? 
+ A.BsT4Jt A.Bs ? 
+ A.BgTSJt A.B9 ? 
+ A.--(1STNRGYCHJ.t-1 A"( I < 0  
+ A.yzPPICHGJ,t-1 A.y2 > 0  
+ A"f3SLGCHGJt A.y3 > 0  
+ A. y4PCIMBPCHJ.t-t A.y4 < 0  
+ A.y5PWRCHGJ,t-t A"fs > 0  
+ A. ysPCFEACHGJ.t-1 A.y6 > 0  
+ A."fTDNSITYCHJ,t-1 A.y1 > 0  
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ.t-1 A"(s > 0  
+ A.y9POPECHGJ.t-1 A.yg > 0  
+ A. "(IOCSCHGJ,t-1 A.yw < 0  
+ A.yuFARMCHGJt A'Yn > 0  
+ (1 -A.) EMPCHG\t-1 {1-A.) > 0 
+ eJt 
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Table 1 1  - Decomposed Changes Model and "Closure Clock" 
Dummies 
Dependent Variable: EMPCHG11 
Decomposed Defense with 
Decomposed Defense "Closure Clock" Dummies 
Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
At. not shown not shown 
PDEFCHGtt 0.48 4.75 •• 0.48 4.79 •• 
NDEFCHGII -0.68 -7.48 •• -0.67 -7.35 •• 
BDEFCHGII -0.96 -5.36 •• -0.60 -3.08 
•• 
DEFDV1 1 630.56 26.42 •• 1 582.35 25.46 •• 
LANDCHGu 1 . 1 7  3.96 •• 1 .22 4.1 1 •• 
TOu 1 52.38 0.46 
Tltt -548.21 -1 .47 
T2tt 1 608.67 4.23 
•• 
Tl11 1 079.60 2.33 . 
T4it 4741 .70 1 0.76 •• 
TS11 1 7 31 .74 3.27 
•• 
STNRGYCH1.1-1 -34.37 -0.85 -33.89 -0.84 
PPICHG1,t-l 297.64 5.68 •• 295.07 5.64 •• 
SLGCHG1, 1 .46 38.02 •• 1 .46 37.98 •• 
PCIMBPCHu-1 0.07 0. 1 2  0.09 0.1 6 
PWRCHG1L1,t-1 1 2 1 .06 7.1 3 •• 1 20.45 7.1 0 •• 
PCFEACHG1.t-1 3.08 2.68 • •  3.06 2.66 •• 
DNSITYCHu-1 1 2354.30 1 5.54 •• 1 231 3.60 1 5.51 •• 
PSRVCHGu-1 568.77 0.77 596.70 0.80 
POPECHG1,t-1 1 239.01 2.1 8 . 1 264.74 2.23 . 
CSCHG1.1-1 -391 7.27 -4.63 
•• -3924.61 -4.64 •• 
FARMCHGtt 0.90 8.35 •• 0.86 7.97 •• 
EMPCHG*t.t-1 
(IV: EMPCHGt.t-z) 0.26 40.64 • •  0.26 40.41 •• 
Final est. of Rho 0.51 1 45.42 •• 0.51 1 45.06 •• 
(counties, n = 3092; periods, T = 19) 
• Significant at the 95 percent level. 
•• Significant at the 99 percent level. 
Note: Models corrected for first order autocorrelation. 
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apprehension, and uncertainty on the part of business planners. However, 
coefficients for the announcement year and the subsequent year do not test 
significantly different from 0. Years two through five reflect positive and 
significant employment effects, with year four being most pronounced. It may be 
that year four at closure sites typical ly marks the peak for returns on reutil ization 
and economic assistance measures (recal l for BRACs '88 and '91 , time to 
closure averaged between 5 Yz and 3 Yz years, respectively) . 
I n  moving from the consolidated defense change equiva lent on the left 
side of Table 8, to the decomposed models of Table 1 1 ,  the signs and 
significance for installation reuti l ization (LANDCHGJ.J and the control variables 
remain unchanged. Again, only the coefficient of the lagged change in per capita 
income maintenance benefit payments variable (PCIMBPCHj.t-1 ) is opposite the 
expected direction. But, l ike the lagged change in state-level energy costs and 
percent change in  service industry employment variables (STN RGYCHj.t-1 and 
PSRVCHGj.t-1) ,  this one stil l  does not test significant. Nonetheless, al l  three of 
these are retained with the belief they are relevant industry location and 
migration determinants. 
A closer look at the relationship between percent chaJlge in other private 
employment (POPECHGJ.t-1) and percent change in service industry employment 
(PSRVCHGJ.t-1) may offer some insight into why the apparent effect of the latter on 
non-farm private employment is insignificant. To begin with, these two 
independent variables are highly, and negatively correlated (r = -0 .540) . With 
regard to regional industry restructuring only, this negative relationship stands to 
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reason; the third sector (manufacturing) cannot be expected to bear al l  the shifts 
into and out of the other two sectors ( i .e . ,  gains to services may come at the 
expense of losses to non-farm private employment sectors other than 
manufacturing) . 
The numbers behind Figure 3 offer some quantitative clarification . From 
1 977 to 1 997, non-farm private employment in the U .S .  grew 57%. Within the 
service industry, employment growth for the same period was more than double 
the overall rate (1 20%) . At the same time, manufacturing declined 4%, while the 
remaining sectors grew 35% in aggregate. The relative magnitudes of these 
values suggest percent change in other private employment is a viable predictor 
of regional growth . For example, through simple extrapolation of the numbers 
above, one might reasonably hypothesize a 1 %  increase in other private 
employment leads to employment increases across services and manufacturing 
combined, by up to 0 .63% [1 - (0.57/0.35)] .  On the other hand, these growth 
trends make it d ifficult to develop a similar hypothesis for service industry 
employment. Clearly, a substantial amount of the growth in services is due to 
industry restructuring, rather than a l l  new employment. Therefore, this variable is 
a weak indicator since it embodies both these effects, with the former effect 
being very pronounced . That does not necessarily preclude the use of a percent 
change in service industry employment variable. But it does imply the effects of 
the two industry structure variables should be viewed together, rather than in 
isolation. 
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Interestingly, the decomposition of the defense personnel change variable 
has very little impact on the remaining variables. As stated, the signs and 
significance test results are unchanged. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the 
control variables generally vary by less than one percent. Only the coefficient of 
the installation reutilization variable (LANDCHGJ,J varies appreciably, decreasing 
from an estimated effect of 1 .  71 jobs ga ined per parceled acre, to 1 . 1 7 . 
The three defense personnel change variables, PDEFCHGJtr NDEFCHGJtr 
and BDEFCHGJ1 a ll have the expected signs. Specifically, the positive coefficient 
for PDEFCHGJ1 supports Proposition (1 ): increases in mil itary base labor force 
levels spur demand driven positive indirect employment effects in the 
surrounding communities. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests these 
indirect employment effects are on the order of 0.48 (e.g. ,  in the short run, 1 00 
new defense jobs create 48 new civil ian jobs, for a net gain of 1 48 jobs) . The 
negative coefficient for NDEFCHGJt supports Proposition (2) : supply driven factors 
such as freed labor and community infrastructure under routine ( i .e. ,  non-BRAC) 
draw downs yield positive employment pressures on local communities . This 
outcome is defended, in part, by the labor force redistributive effects of defense 
dynamics, as d iscussed on page 43 . 
At first glance, the negative defense change (NDEFCHGJt) coefficient value 
of -0.67 in the "closure clock" model of Table 1 1  appears excessive - especially 
relative to the coefficient value of 0.48 for positive defense changes (PDEFCHGJJ ·  
But looking back at F igure 1 on page 9 ,  it should b e  noted the period of review 
(i .e. , 1 977 - 1 997) covered defense personnel shifts after the manning peak of 
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1 968, at which time defense infrastructure adequately supported 4 .9  mill ion 
personnel. So in many cases, positive defense personnel changes involved 
reutilizing existing, but idle public facilities . Consequently, the coefficient for 
PDEFCHGJt is dampened compared to what may have been realized if al l  
personnel increases during this period necessitated the construction and upkeep 
of completely new facilities. At the same time, defense personnel downsizing 
during this period did not a lways translate to defense spending decreases. This 
becomes evident in F igure 8, where the mid-70's through late 80's experienced 
disproportionate growth in spending. 
The concept of outsourcing defense operations, which came into vogue 
during in the early 80's, can help explain the divergence between defense 
personnel levels and spending in Figure 8. In short, the DoD began transferring 
functions not considered inherently governmental from their federal employees to 
defense contractors. As a uniformed member walked out the door one day, a 
defense industry employee who fulfilled the same function (often the same 
individual) replaced the defense worker shortly thereafter. While incorporation of 
related spending data would certainly control for these effects, regrettably such 
data are not available. Specifically, current summary records only track these 
expenditures to the point of payment (e.g. ,  the prime contractor's corporate 
headquarters) , which may differ from the benefiting community, or even state. 
This l imitation is duly noted in a number of related studies (e.g. ,  Hooker and 
Knetter, 1 997;  Brauer and Marlin, 1 992; Cumberland, 1 973) .  Under simi lar 
circumstances, -0.67 is probably representative of the effects of non-BRAC 
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defense personnel downsizing actions. But in the case of downsizing "without 
substitution," this estimate is l ikely biased upward in magnitude. Nonetheless, 
the redistributive effects of defense labor force dynamics and other factors 
related to downsizing -- such as suppressed rents, decrease property values, 
and excess labor supply -- are certain to exert favorable industry location and 
employment pressures. 
The results for the BRAG related personnel reductions (BDEFCHGJt) , along 
with the installation reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJJ support Proposition {3). 
Specifical ly, the negative sign for BDEFCHGJtr coupled with the positive sign for 
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LANDCHGJt imply base closure impacts are mitigated to some extent by the 
community infrastructure vacuum created through departure of military residents, 
and by efforts to promote private reutilization of otherwise idle defense facilities. 
The magnitude of the LANDCHGJt coefficient is about the same across both 
models in Table 1 1 ,  again suggesting short run effects are 6 new jobs created for 
every 5 acres of reutilized land . In the "closure clock" dummy variable model of 
Table 1 1 ,  the magnitude of the BDEFCHGJt coefficient estimate drops 
substantial ly, from -0.96 to -0.60. It appears BDEFCHGJt was picking up some 
of the effects of state and federal economic aid before inclusion of the "closure 
clock" dummy regime. 
The observations in the data set reflect total acreage released as of 
November 2000, a llocated across the preceding periods, in proportion to BRAG 
related personnel reductions. Consequently, LANDCHGJt and BDEFCHGJt are 
highly correlated. G iven this approach assumes facilities were released 
immediately as they became available, yet media reports and OEA records 
suggest substantia l  delays were involved, examination of lagged LANDCHGJt 
values may a lleviate some of the coll inearity problem while painting a more 
real istic picture of actual events. This avenue is explored next. 
Lagged Installation Reutilization Proxies 
The second model of Table 1 1  is rerun with the installation reutil ization 
proxy, LANDCHGJt• lagged one, two, then three periods to examine the role of 
delays in facil ity conveyance efforts. The results of these three models are 
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presented in Table 1 2. While size, significance, and signs of the control 
variables do not change markedly, in al l  three models the absolute magnitude of 
BDEFCHGjt increases somewhat (from -0.60 in Table 1 1 ,  to -0.87, -1 .01 , and 
-0.87 in the respective first, second, and third Jag models of Table 1 2) .  In the 
absence of details regarding the actual pattern of conveyance delays, the third 
lag model (LANDCHGJ,t-3) is the model of choice as more "closure clock" 
dummies test significant in this specification than under the other three models. 
The implicit assumption is that typical ly three years lapse before excessed 
military land and facil ities are put to productive private use. 
The LANDCHGJ.t-3 model suggests the apprehension of closure 
announcement represents a brief hiccup. The immediate release, or 
decongestion of community infrastructure and housing, and the local surplus of 
labor act to counter the apprehension, as businesses recognize an opportunity 
for low cost startup, expansion, and production. The magnitude of BDEFCHGJt 
suggests this occurs at a rate of 0.87 new jobs for every BRAC related job loss. 
At the same time, private reutil ization of defense facilities translates to around 
two new jobs for every acre conveyed, though conveyance typical ly entails a 
three-year delay, during which facilities remain idle. Finally, the effects of aid 
related opportunism typical ly peak in the fourth year. 
Industry Specialization and Defense-to-Labor Force Interactions 
Propositions (4) and (5) examine the elasticities of the defense 
employment effects modeled thus far, to regional industry structure and labor 
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Table 1 2 - Examination of Lagged Base Reutilization Proxies 
Dependent Variable: EMPCHGJ1 
LANDCHGJ,t-1 LANDCHGJ,t-z LANDCHGJ,t-3 
Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
At not shown not shown not shown 
PDEFCHG1t 0.48 4 .76 •• 0.49 4.80 •• 0.49 4.81 •• 
NDEFCHGJt -0.66 -7.27 •• -0.67 -7.32 •• -0.68 -7.42 •• 
BDEFCHG1t -0.87 -4.88 •• -1 .01 -5 .72 •• -0.87 -4.88 •• 
DEFDV1 1 578.16 25 .40 
•• 1 572.53 25.31 •• 1 572.85 25.31 •• 
ILANDcHG1z 1 .62 5 .97 •• 2.31 8.84 •• 2 .05 5.66 •• 1 
TOJt 1 59. 1 3  0.48 1 58.55 0.47 1 54.47 0.46 
Tltt -472.92 -1 .27 -543.29 - 1 .46 -472.47 -1 .27 
T2Jt 1 457.28 3 .83 •• 1 602.58 4.22 •• 1 71 0.33 4.50 •• 
T3Jt 71 1 . 1 6  1 .52 569.44 1 .22 1 22 1 .33 2 .63 •• 
T4Jt 4355.07 9.79 •• 4032.03 9.01 •• 4459.68 1 0.06 •• 
T51, 1 649.99 3 .1 1 •• 1 1 62.35 2 .17 • 1 552.28 2 .91 •• 
STNRGYCHJ,t-1 -32.92 -0.82 -32.89 -0.82 -32.48 -0.81 
PPICHG1.t-1 295.63 5.65 •• 294.37 5 .63 •• 293 .74 5 .61 •• 
SLGCHGJt 1 .45 37 .90 •• 1 .46 38.1 3 •• 1 .46 38.05 •• 
PCIMBPCH1,t-1 0.06 0. 1 1  0.06 0.1 1 0.09 0. 1 7  
PWRCHGlL.J.t-1 1 20.27 7.09 •• 1 20.09 7 .08 •• 1 20.1 2  7 .08 •• 
PCFEACHGJ.t-1 3 .04 2 .64 •• 3.05 2 .65 •• 3.05 2.65 •• 
DNSITYCHJ.t-1 1 2367 .00 1 5. 59 •• 1 2388.90 1 5.62 •• 1 2358.00 1 5 .58 •• 
PSRVCHG1.t-1 587.96 0.79 601 .88 0.81 592.66 0.80 
POPECHGJ.t-1 1 263.57 2.23 • 1 261 .60 2.23 . 1 265.94 2.23 • 
CSCHGJ,t-1 -3937.52 -4.65 •• -3919.87 -4.64 •• -3926.07 -4.64 •• 
FARMCHGJt 0.85 7.91 •• 0.87 8.04 •• 0.88 8.1 2 •• 
EMPCHG*t.t-1 
(IV: EMPCHGJ,t-z) 0.26 40.45 •• 0.26 40. 1 8  •• 0.26 40. 1 9  •• 
Final est. of Rho 0.51 1 44.94 • •  0.51 1 45.08 • •  0.51 1 44.90 •• 
(counties, n = 3092; periods, T = 19) 
• Siqnificant at the 95 percent level. 
•• Siqnificant at the 99 percent level. 
Note: Models corrected for first order autocorrelation. 
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force size relative to defense presence. Specifica l ly, Proposition (4) states that 
regions with h ighly special ized industry are less sensitive to mi l itary base 
employment changes because these regions l ikely thrive on export activities. 
Proposition (5) states base employment effects are more pronounced in regions 
with relatively smaller non-defense employment because these regions are less 
l ikely to have achieved their ful l  potential  for scale economies . To accommodate 
examination of these propositions, the model in equation (1 2) is modified with 
interaction terms. Specifically, equation (1 3) incorporates lagged values of the 
changes in industry specialization (CSCHGJ,t-1 )  and defense-to-labor force ratio 
(D2LFCHGJ,t-1) . 48 
The expectations that support propositions (4) and (5) can also be 
expressed in simple form through the first derivative of the dependent variable 
with respect to each element of the decomposed defense personnel change 
variable . This form is presented in equations (1 4) through (1 6), a long with 
expectations of the overal l  signs. 
Note that a lagged value of the change in defense-to-labor force ratio 
(D2LFCHGJ,t-1) is included in equation (1 3) as a stand a lone variable. This is to 
gauge if the significance of the combined term is driven purely by the interaction 
component (as noted previously, CSCHGJ,t-1 is already in the model as an industry 
48 This specification of the interactions cannot be literally transformed back to the Levels form of 
the model with economic meaning. Keeping with the intent of developing a true Changes model, 
the interactions are modeled with changes rather levels for these two terms. The interpretation of 
these lagged terms still holds. For example, increases in industry specialization and decreases in 
the ratio of defense personnel to the local labor force are expected to dampen the effects of the 
primary variable (PDEFCHGJt, NDEFCHGJt, or BDEFCHGjtr as the case may be). 
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EMPCHG1t = At (1 3) 
+ A.P1aPDEFCHGJt A.P1a > 0 
+ A.Pu,PDEFCHG1t*CSCHG1.t-1 A.P1b < o 
+ A.P1cPDEFCHGJt *D2LFCHGJ.t-1 A.P1c > 0 
+ A.PtdNDEFCHGJt A.P1d < 0  
+ A.P1eNDEFCHG1t *CSCHGJ.t-1 A.P1e > 0 
+ A.PlfNDEFCHG11*D2LFCHG1.t-1 A.P1r < 0 
+ A.p1gBDEFCHGjt A.P1s < o 
+ A.P1hBDEFCHG1t *CSCHGJ.t-1 A.P1h > o 
+ A.PuBDEFCHG1t *D2LFCHG1.t-1 A.Pu < 0 
+ A.P2DEFDVJ A.p2 > 0  
+ A.P3LANDCHG1.t-3 A.p3 > 0  
+ A.p4TOJt A.p4 ? 
+ A.PsT1Jt A.Ps ? 
+ A.PsT2Jt A.p6 ? 
+ A.p7T31t A.� ? 
+ A.PsT4Jt A.Ps ? 
+ A.J3gT51t A.pg ? 
+ A.p!OD2LFCHG1.t-1 A.P10 ? 
+ A.y1STNRGYCHJ.t-1 A.y1 < 0  
+ A.y2PPICHG1.t-1 A.y2 > 0  
+ A.y3SLGCHG1t A.y3 > 0  
+ A.y4PCIMBPCH1.t- 1  A.y4 < 0  
+ A.ysPWRCHGJ.t-t A.ys > 0  
+ A.ysPCFEACHGJ.t-1 A.y6 > 0  
+ A.y1DNSITYCH1.t-1 A.y1 > 0  
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ,t-1 A.ys > 0  
+ A.ygPOPECHG1.t-1 A.y9 > 0  
+ A.y10CSCHG1.t-1 A.yw < 0  
+ A.yuFARMCHG1t A.yu > 0  
+ AY12CSJ.t-t AY12 < 0 




= A.�ta + A.�1bCSCHGJ.t-1 + A.�tcD2LFCHGJ,t-1 > 0 (1 4) 
(+) (-) (+) 
()EMPCHGJti()NDEFCHGJt 
= A.�td + A.�1eCSCHGJ.t-1 + A.�uD2LFCHGJ,t-t < 0 (1 5) 
(-) (+) (-) 
aEMPCHGJti()BDEFCHGJt 
= A.�tg + A.�1hCSCHGJ,t-t + A.�uD2LFCHGJ,t-1 < 0 (1 6) 
(-) (+) (-) 
location control variable) . A priori arguments cannot be made either way about 
the direction of D2LFCHGJ,t-1 · so this stand a lone variable carries no anticipated 
sign . The results of the decomposed Changes model with "closure clock" 
dummies, a three-year lagged installation reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJ,t-J) , and 
interaction terms are presented in Table 1 3 . 
The first thing that becomes apparent from Table 1 3  is that significance, 
signs, and magnitudes for the non-defense variable coefficients are not materially 
different after inclusion of the interaction terms. Secondly, the signs for 
PDEFCHGJt*CSCHGJ,t-1 .  NDEFCHGJ1*CSCHGJ,t-1 ·  and BDEFCHGJ1*D2LFCHGJ,t-1 are 
consistent with Propositions (4) and (5) . However, with the exception of 
BDEFCHGJt*D2LFCHGJ,t-I . none of the interaction terms test significantly d ifferent 
from zero in magnitude. This suggests changes in the local defense-to-labor 
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Table 13 - Examination of Lagged 
Interaction Terms 
Dependent Variable: EMPCHG11 
Coeff T-Stat 
At not shown 
PDEFCHG1t 0.48 




NDEFCHG11 *DZLFCHGt.t-1 0.07 
BDEFCHG1t -1 .06 
BDEFCHG11*CSCHGt.t-1 -10.1 3 
BDEFCHG11*D2LFCHGu.1 - 24.87 
DEFDV1 1 568.47 
LANDCHG1.t-3 2.01 
T01t 1 50.56 
Tl1t -393.07 
T21t 1 81 4.93 
T31t 1 283.22 
T411 4564.59 
T51t 1 567.47 
DZLFCHGu-1 22. 32 
STNRGYCH1.t-1 -32.78 
PPICHG1.1.1 292.90 
SLGCHG11 1 .46 
PCIMBPCH1.t-l 0. 1 0  
PWRCHG 1L1.t·l 1 1 9.86 
PCFEACHG1.t-l 3 .06 
DNSITYCH1.t-l 1 2353.90 
PSRVCHG1.t-t 610.32 
POPECHG1.t-l 1 270.70 
CSCHG1.1-1 -3933 . 7 1  
FARMCHG1t 0.89 
EMPCHG\t-1 
(IV: EMPCHGj.,.z) 0. 26 
Final est. of Rho 0.51 
(counties, n 
= 
3092; periods, T = 19) 
• Significant at the 95 percent level 
•• Significant at the 99 percent level 
Note: Model corrected for first order autocorrelation 
1 1 0 
4.68 •• 
-0. 1 6  
-0.95 







5.54 • • 
0.45 
-1 .05 
4.74 • •  
2 . 76 •• 
1 0.26 • • 
2.94 • •  
2.89 • •  
-0.81 
5 .60 • •  
38.02 • •  
0.1 7 
7 .06 •• 
2 .66 •• 
1 5.57 • •  
0.82 




1 44.60 • •  
force ratio material ly influence the impact of defense personnel reductions. 
Specifical ly, as this ratio becomes smaller, the favorable employment effects of 
BRAC (i .e . ,  freed labor and community infrastructure, and base facil ities 
reutilization) become less pronounced . 49 The insignificance of the other five 
interactions suggests changes in the degree of regional industry specialization do 
not materially influence the effects of defense personnel changes on local 
employment. Likewise, county level employment effects of ordinary defense 
workforce expansions and contractions are not sensitive to changes in the local 
defense-to-labor force ratio. 
As expected, the stand-alone variable representing lagged change in the 
coefficient of specialization is negative and significant, implying specialized 
regions do not general ly fair as wel l  as those that are diversified . The coefficient 
for the stand-alone lagged change in defense-to-labor force ratio (D2LFCHGJ,t-I) 
is positive and significant. Coupled with the results for the 
BDEFCHGJt*D2LFCHGJ.t-I interaction term, this seems to suggest employment in 
counties with a greater mil itary presence tends to grow at a faster rate than that 
of counties with little or no mil itary presence. This conclusion lends l ittle support 
to the Hooker and Knetter {1 999) argument that mi litary salaries bring down 
community earnings averages. If that were truly the case, the hypothesized 
49 In general, BRAC related downsizing implies the local defense-to-labor force ratio is 
decreasing, so observed values of D2LFCHGJ,t-I should be negative. In fact, where BRAC related 
personnel changes occurred the mean value for D2LFCHGJ.t-l was -0.009. 
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lower average earnings should translate to smaller induced employment effects, 
rather than faster growth . 
G iven the many interaction terms of the model in Table 1 3, it is difficult to 
interpret the overal l  employment effects of mi litary bases without some 
computation involving the three components for each type of defense personnel 
change (refer to equations (1 4), (1 5), and (1 6) on page 1 09) . This is particularly 
true in the case of BRAC related personnel changes, since one of the interaction 
terms tests significantly different from 0.  To address this concern, the coefficient 
estimates from Table 1 3  are multiplied with observed values of the interaction 
terms, then summed, resulting in "fitted" employment impacts. The means for 
these fitted values, plus their first and second standard deviation intervals, are 
presented in Table 1 4 .  To preclude skewing these figures toward 0, they are 
based only on observations where PDEFCHGJt. NDEFCHGJt. and BDEFCHGJ11 
respectively, did not reflect values of 0 (the number of inclusive observations is 
noted) . Calculated va lues are reported for the period 1 979-97 (1 989-97 in the 
case of BRAC related personnel changes), and then for the first and last years of 
this interval for comparative purposes. 
While there is very l ittle variabi l ity in the fitted values for ordinary negative 
defense personnel changes, those of BRAC related personnel losses are 
dispersed widely about the mean. This rough sketch of defense employment 
effects seems to suggest that in general, the community infrastructure vacuum 
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Table 14 - Fitted Effects of Defense Personnel Changes 
on County Level Employment 
Period • 2SD -1 SD Mean + 1 SD + 2SD Obs 
Fitted Effects of Positive Defense Personnel Changes 
1979-97 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.56 0.64 3645 
1 979 only -0.20 0.1 5  0.49 0.84 1 . 1 8  1 97 
1 997 only 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 1 40 
Fitted Effects of Ordinary Negative Defense Personnel Changes 
1 979-97 -0.70 -0.69 -0.68 -0.67 -0.66 391 4  
1979 only -0.75 -0.71 -0.67 -0.63 -0.59 1 90 
1 997 only -0.69 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 239 
Fitted Effects of BRAC Related Negative Defense Personnel Changes 
1 989-97 -2.08 -1 .45 -0.82 -0.18 0.45 341 
1 989 only -1 . 1 8  -1 .05 -0.91 -0.78 -0.65 9 
1 997 only -1 .46 - 1 . 1 8  -0.91 -0.63 -0.36 71 
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created through BRAC made for favorable employment conditions. 50 But, the 
degree of these effects varies appreciably from base to base, and in few cases, 
favorable effects are not present. Interestingly, the mean value of -0.82 is six 
percent less than the estimate of -0.87 in the same model, before incorporation 
of interaction terms. The failure to consider the elasticity of defense personnel 
changes to changes in industry and workforce composition may have led to 
some downward (negative) bias for this variable. 
Long Run Employment Effects 
Referring back to the development of the partia l  adjustment model in 
equation (2) , page 4 7,  the coefficients for all the defense and control variables 
include the apportioning factor A,, such that 0 � A � 1 .  The implication is that the 
estimated coefficient values for al l  these variables represent the short run 
component of their employment effects. As Greene (2000) notes, the 
corresponding long run effects can be recovered util izing the parameter estimate 
for the lagged dependent variable (or it's instrument, in this study) . Specifically, 
the coefficient for EMPCHG*j.t-1 is (1 - A.) in equation (2) .  From Table 1 3, (1 - A.) = 
0.26, so A =  0.74 .  Dividing coefficient estimates for the remaining variables in 
Table 1 3  by 0.74 yields their estimated long run effects on county level non-farm 
private employment. For example, the model results suggest the long run 
50 Of the fitted values, 95 percent fall between -2.08 and 0.45, with an overal l  mean of -0.82. 
Recall observed values for ordinary and BRAC related personnel decreases are negative, so 
these negative coefficient estimates imply positive employment effects) . 
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employment effect of instal lation reutilization is 2.01 /0 .74 = 2 . 70jobs for every 
acre divested . Estimated long run effects of defense personnel changes are 
determined similarly. Using coefficient estimates from Table 1 2  (before 
interactions) and the means from the fitted values on Table 1 4  (after 
interactions) , long run employment effects are approximated in Table 1 5 . 
The figures in Table 1 5  indicate the long run employment effects of 
defense personnel increases are on the order of 0.65. In other words, for 1 00 
new military base workers, outside employment increases by 48 in the year of 
change, and by a total of 65 over the long run. This translates to a long run 
multiplier of 1 .65.  In periods of ordinary downsizing, the loss of 1 00 defense jobs 
frees up the labor and community infrastructure necessary to attract a net of 68 
new jobs in the year of change, and a total of 92 over the long run.  The implied 
long run multiplier for ordinary reductions, then, is 1 - 0.92 = 0.08. Final ly, in the 
case of BRAC related downsizing, the loss of 1 00 defense jobs frees up the 
labor, community infrastructure, and defense facil ities to generate a net of 82 
new jobs in the year of change, and a total of 1 1 0 over the long run.  This leads 
to a long run multiplier of -0. 1 0  for BRAC related reductions. Once again, care 
should be taken in interpreting multipliers for both ordinary and BRAC related 
reductions. Specifically, these estimates are derived from data covering a period 
when outsourcing was commonplace. Furthermore, over one bi l l ion dollars in 
federal assistance was channeled to BRAC communities to aid in reutil ization 
efforts and provide economic relief. The details necessary to model and control 
for both these factors were not available. At best, the "closure clock" dummy 
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Table 1 5  - Estimated Long Run Employment Effects 
Before Interactions (Table 12) After Interactions (Table 1 3) 
Positive Personnel Changes 
0.49 / 0.74 = 0.66 0.48 / 0.74 = 0.65 
Ordinary Negative Personnel Changes 
-0.68 / 0.74 = -0.91  -0.68 / 0. 74 = -0.92 
BRAC Related Negative Personnel Changes 
-0.87 I 0. 7 4 = -1 . 1 6  -0.82 / 0. 74 = - 1 . 1 0  
regime captures a portion of the financial aid influence . The remaining effects of 
these two factors are l ikely embedded in the ordinary and BRAC related 
downsizing multipliers. Under similar conditions, similar results may be 
expected . But, in the case where a id is not provided, or downsizing takes place 
without substitution, or outsourcing, the favorable employment effects of defense 
reductions are certain to be somewhat less than these estimates suggest. 
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
This empirical study explored the general effects of military installations on 
local employment, and the special case of closure under the Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) proceedings of 1 988, 1 991 , 1 993, and 1 995 .  A novel panel 
data set incorporating 21 years of military and private industry observations for 
963 military installations and 3,092 counties a llowed comprehensive modeling 
and examination of defense related employment trends across all 50 states. The 
collection of sub-county defense personnel figures addressed a shortcoming of 
other county-level impact studies, which reconcile community employment 
changes against base closure personnel losses, without consideration of 
personnel dynamics at other military installations within the same county. To the 
extent that counties host more than one base, resulting impact estimates of such 
studies are biased . This outcome is highly l ikely given the data set revea led 88 
counties hosting 97 major BRAC sites, were also home to 1 95 other military 
facilities that continued operations through the draw downs. 
Particular attention was given to the propositions that while increases in 
defense personnel spur positive employment effects (+/+) , ord inary personnel 
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decreases, and those occurring under base closure conditions, exert favorable 
employment pressures as well (-/+) .  These hypotheses run counter to 
conventional wisdom. In particular, the implicit assumption of economic base 
theory and input-output modeling techniques is that impacts of defense 
personnel changes on local employment are symmetrical .  In  other words, the 
effects of employment bui ld-up are equal ,  but opposite in sign to those of job 
removal .  This conclusion stands to reason from a gross impact perspective. But 
from a net impact perspective, this idea is chal lenged through simple reasoning. 
New growth and expansion of existing operations is certain to create jobs related 
to facilities and infrastructure construction and maintenance. Abandonment is 
likely to have an opposite effect of equal magnitude. But, abandonment is also 
likely to spur job creation through job destruction, particularly if there is a demand 
for a low cost alternative to new construction and infrastructure development. 
The changes specification allowed examination of asymmetrical effects 
through decomposition of defense personnel changes into its positive, negative, 
and BRAC related components. Ordinary indirect and induced effects that 
accompany exogenous employment growth easily justify the +/+ hypothesis. The 
-1+ proposition is defended through: (1 ) the labor force redistributive effect of 
defense recruiting and attrition dynamics; (2) the community and public goods 
infrastructure vacuum that accompanies military downsizing; and (3) the 
countervailing employment effects of economic aid and reutilization efforts 
targeted at base closure sites . 
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There is evidence of an asymmetrical relationship between military 
personnel level changes, and local community employment. Specifical ly, 
coefficient estimates suggest the short and long run indirect and induced 
employment effects of positive defense personnel increases on loca l non-farm 
private employment are 0 .48 and 0.65, respectively. The corresponding 
multipliers for military installation personnel increases, then, are 1 .48 and 1 .65 .  
With respect to ordinary personnel reductions, the short and long run coefficient 
estimates are -0.68 and -0 .92, respectively. The inferred multipliers, then, are 
0.32 and 0.08. I nterpreting this literally, in the short run, if one job is removed 
from a base, the net loss to the community is: -1 defense worker + 0.68 private 
industry workers = - 0.32 netjob loss (or -1 x 0.32 = -0.32) . Likewise, the 
average estimated short and long run effects of personnel reductions for BRAC 
locations are -0.82 and -1 . 1  0, respectively, which suggest multipliers of -0. 1 8  and 
+0.1 0. However, care must be exercised in interpreting coefficient estimates for 
negative personnel changes (ordinary and BRAC related}. Specifically, though 
the corresponding variables were chosen to capture the effects of labor force 
supply side pressures and community and public goods infrastructure vacuums, 
they also embody the effects of government outsourcing, and over one bi l l ion 
dollars in federal relief targeted at BRAC communities across a window of 9 
years. A weakness of this study is the absence of detai led data to control for 
these two factors. For example, defense spending records that might capture the 
extent of outsourcing at the local levels, reflect only the point of payment to prime 
contractors, rather than the communities which derive employment benefits from 
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this spending. Regarding BRAC related financial aid, effort was made to control 
for this factor in the form of a base "closure clock" dummy variable regime. But 
the broad assumption here is that aid was apportioned evenly across al l  BRAC 
locations, under the same relative payout schedules. Naturally, the coefficients 
for negative personnel changes reflect one or both of these flaws. Since both 
these factors exert positive employment pressures, it is l ikely the estimated 
employment effects of military downsizing (BRAC and ordinary) are upward 
biased . This does not rule out support for asymmetrical employment effects 
related to defense workforce dynamics. But it does suggest that absent similar 
aid and outsourcing patterns, the estimated effects of downsizing are a bit 
optimistic. 
Of interest is the differential between coefficient estimates for ordinary 
negative personnel changes and BRAC related personnel reductions. 
Specifically, the favorable employment effects associated with BRAC reductions 
were 20 percent greater than those estimated for ordinary downsizing. Again, 
federal assistance is a likely contributor to this difference. But, in conjunction 
with the positive and significant coefficient estimate for the installation and 
facilities reutil ization proxy, LANDCHGJ,t-3• this implies efforts to promote 
conversion of public resources to private use were genera lly effective. 
Though review of the literature, media, and defense records revealed only 
anecdotal support for claims of delays in delivery of aid and conversion of 
defense facilities, empirical results of the model corroborate these assertions. 
Specifically, after considering various lags for the reutilization proxy, 
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LANDCHGJ.?. the three-year lag specification fit best with the remaining variables . 
The implication is that on average, three years lapsed between vacancy and the 
final parceling of facilities for private reuse. Furthermore, significance and 
magnitudes for the "closure clock" dummy regime suggest the effects of financial 
aid and efforts to promote conversion kicked in on the second year, and reached 
their peak by the fourth year, following selection for closure. 
There is l ittle support for the idea that defense employment impacts in 
counties characterized by more specialized industry structures are dampened. 
While this expectation is explicitly modeled, and the signs of the coefficient 
estimates are as anticipated (with the exception of BRAC related personnel 
reductions), in al l  cases they do not test significantly different from 0. On the 
other hand, for BRAC related personnel reductions, there is evidence that 
favorable employment effects are less pronounced in communities where overall 
defense presence is also dwindling. 
The idea of downsizing and closure is never appealing - particularly to 
those whose jobs are being eliminated and the communities that host them. But, 
in the case of DoD personnel and infrastructure reductions, the picture is not all 
doom and gloom. For example, the potential for reutilization of public assets 
represents low cost alternatives to new construction for private industry. Off­
base housing and infrastructure released to the community by departing 
servicemen and women also present low cost expansion opportunities. Perhaps 
those who suffer most are the landholders, whose property values may 
depreciate in the wake of BRAC (as evidenced by programs to offset housing 
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sales losses sustained by defense personnel leaving closure communities) . But, 
even this temporary setback serves to draw new growth and opportunity for the 
effected community. Though there will a lways be an exception - individuals or 
communities that suffer more than the results of this study suggest - these 
exceptions must be balanced against the bigger picture: a Department of 
Defense with a growing mission, constrained budgets, and aging, idle 
infrastructure that is sapping much needed funds away from operations and 
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Appendix A - PCI Growth as the Dependent Variable 
Local employment effects of changes to defense operations are not the 
only worry of political representatives, civic leaders, and residents of affected 
communities . Resulting changes in the earnings of those left behind are also a 
serious concern. Though the focus of this study is not with that concern, a rough 
adaptation of the model on page 97 is explored to shed some light in this area . 
Specifically, using the model in equation (1 2) ,  the percent change in per capita 
income (PCIGROTHJt) is substituted as the dependent variable, while 
PCIGROTHJ,t-2 is used as an instrumenta l variable for the lagged dependent 
variable, PCIGROTHJ,t-t (IV denoted : PCIGROTH\t-t) .  The purpose is not to 
precisely model regional earnings growth, but rather to see how the previously 
modeled employment determinants might influence income, with particular 
attention given to the direction of defense personnel and installation reutilization 
effects. The model is run in three variations, with defense personnel changes (1 ) 
aggregated into one variable (1 -way defense change); (2) decomposed into 
positive and negative changes only (2-way defense change); and (3) 
decomposed into positive changes, negative changes related to on-going 
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operations, and negative changes related to BRAC (3-way defense change) . 
The outcomes for al l  three are presented in Table A-1 . 
Of interest are the consistently positive coefficients for a l l  the defense 
personnel variables in al l three models. In particular, defense personnel changes 
(DEFCHGJt) in the 1 -way model, and positive defense personnel changes 
(PDEFCHGJt) in the 2- and 3-way models are both positive and significant. 
Looking at the DEFCHGJt coefficient in the 1 -way model, its value of 0.000003 
seems to suggest an increase of 3,3 1 0  military and federal civil ian defense jobs 
leads to regional per capita income growth of 1 %. Of course specification issues 
and the possibil ity of omitted variable bias place the magnitudes of these 
parameter estimates in question. But, the positive direction deserves attention 
as it suggests defense personnel typical ly increase earnings averages for their 
communities. This is consistent with the interpretation of the stand-alone 
defense-to-labor force change variable, D2LFCHGJ,t-I .  in the interaction model of 
Table 1 3  (see related discussion, beginning on page 1 1 1 ) .  These combined 
results run counter to those of Hooker and Knetter. Specifically, Hooker and 
Knetter (1 999) find local defense personnel decreases lead to per capita income 
increases. It should be noted their study is restricted to a much smaller sampling 
(Cal ifornia only) , and their coefficients do not test significantly d ifferent from 0 .  
While it may be that i n  a few high cost areas, military presence does indeed bring 
down overal l earnings averages, the results of this study suggest that on the 
whole, just the opposite is true. 
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Table A - Changes Model with PCI Growth as the Dependent Variable 
Dependent Variable: PCIGROTH1t 
Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
AJ not shown not shown not shown 
DEFCHG1t 0.000003 2.58 •• 
PDEFCHG1t 0.000005 2.67 .. 0.000005 2.68 .. 
NDFCHG1t 0.000002 1 . 1 7  0.000002 1 . 23 
BDEFCHG1, 0.000001 0.28 
DEFDV1 -0.000284 -0.48 -0.000521 -0.84 -0.000494 -0.79 
LANDCHG1.t-3 0.000002 0.37 0.000002 0.35 0.000002 0.32 
T01, 0.002563 0.37 0.002181 0.32 0.002306 0. 33 
Tljt -0.01 1 460 -1 .61 -0.01 1 990 -1 .68 -0.01 2398 -1 .72 
T21, 0.00531 7  0.75 0.004468 0.63 0.003857 0.53 
T31, -0.005809 -0.67 -0.0071 1 4  -0.82 -0.008007 -0.88 
T41t 0.001 968 0.23 0.001 249 0.1 4 0.000662 0.08 
T51t -0.01 2042 -1 .06 -0.01 2766 -1 . 1 2 -0.01 341 6 -1 . 1 6  
STNRGYCH1,t-1 0.001 623 1 .87 0.001 61 9 1 .87 0.001 620 1 .87 
PPICHG1.t-t -0.01 0502 -9.87 •• -0.01 0500 -9.87 •• -0.010501 -9.87 •• 
SLGCHG1, 0.000002 3.05 •• 0.000002 2.93 •• 0.000002 2.94 •• 
PCIMPLCH -0.000009 -0.81 -0.000009 -0.83 -0.000009 -0.83 
PWRCHG1.t-1 0.004364 1 2.41 •• 0.004364 1 2.41 •• 0.004365 1 2.41 •• 
PCFEACHGJ.t-1 -0.000081 -2.87 • •  -0.000081 -2.87 •• -0.000081 -2.87 •• 
DNSITYCH1.t-1 -0.000052 0.00 -0.000057 -0.01 0.000097 0.01 
PSRVCCHG1.t-1 -0.021 732 -1 .31 -0.021 673 -1 .31 -0.021 674 -1 .31 
POPECHG1.t-1 0.0031 85 0.25 0.003268 0.26 0.003267 0.26 
CSCHG1,t-1 0.093040 5.1 2 •• 0.0931 24 5.1 2 •• 0.093107 5 .1 2 •• 
FARMCHG1, 0.000007 2.88 •• 0.000007 2.89 • •  0.000007 2.89 •• 
PCIGROTH\t-1 
(IV: PCIGROTHJ,t-2) -0.00001 8 -3.69 •• -0.00001 8 -3.69 •• -0.00001 8  -3.69 •• 
Final est. of Rho -0. 2901 91 -73.50 • •  -0.2901 99 -73.50 •• -0.290201 -73.50 •• 
(counties, n = 3092; periods, T = 19} 
• Significant at the 95 percent level . 
.. Significant at the 99 percent level. 
Note: Models corrected for first order autocorrelation.  
1 32 
The other noteworthy results are the coefficient for the installation 
reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJt) is positive in al l  three models, and that of the 
defense county dummy variable, DEFDVJI is negative in a l l  three. The 
LANDCHGJt result implies reuti l ization has favorable effects on local earnings, 
whereas the sign for DEFDVJ suggests, ceteris paribus, earnings growth in 
defense counties trai l  that of non-defense counties. But, both these effects do 
not test significantly different from 0.  
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Appendix B - First Stage of Instrumental Variable Estimation 
The equation estimated in the first stage of the 2SLS routine, when 
EMPCHGJ.t-2 is the instrument for the lagged dependent variable EMPCHGJ.t-1. 
follows: 






+ A. y3SLGCHGJt 
+ A. 'Y4PCIMBPCHJ,t-1 
+ A.ysPWRCHGJ,t-1 






+ (1 -A.) EMPCHGJ,t-2 
+ eJt 
(17) 
Note that this first equation takes the same form as the original regression 
model, with the exceptions that the lagged dependent variable is substituted for 
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the dependent variable, and the instrument is substituted for the lagged 
dependent variable. Results are summarized in Table B-1 . For the second 
stage of the routine, fitted values of EMPCHGJ,t-I are derived from these estimated 
coefficients, then substituted back into the original regression equation, yielding 
the results presented in Table 8 on page 92. 
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Table B - First Stage Results from 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Dependent Variable: EMPCHG.t.t-1 
Coeff T-Stat 
At not shown 
DEFCHG1, -0. 1 8  -3 .38 • •  
DEFDV1 61 8 . 1 8 1 8.20 .. 
LANDCHG1, 0.86 4 .37 • •  
STNRGYCHI.t-1 -1 88.1 2 -4.62 .. 
PPICHGu_1 -737 .35 -1 4 .43 • •  
SLGCHG1, 1 .83 60.96 .. 
PCIMBPCH1.t-1 -2 .40 -4.38 • •  
PWRCHG1.1-1 1 3 .29 0.79 
PCFEACHGu-1 -1 .22 -0.97 
DNSITYCHI.t-1 81 30.73 1 3.70 .. 
PSRVCCHGI.t-1 -258.46 -0.34 
POPECHGu-1 -1 425 .66 -2.43 • 
CSCHG1,1-1 7208. 86 8 .44 • •  
FARMCHG11 -0.43 -3.99 • •  
EMPCHG1.1-2 0.63 204. 64 .. 
(counties, n = 3092; periods, T = 19) 
• Significant at the 95 percent level .  
• •  Significant at the 99 percent level. 
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Appendix C - Major BRAC Bases 
Instal lation/City 




Ira Eaker Air Force Base 
Williams Air Force Base 
Alameda 
Castle Air Force Base 
El Toro Marine Corps Air Station 
Fort Ord 
George Air Force Base 
Long Beach 
March Air Force Base 
Mare Island Naval Shipyard 
Mather Air Force Base 
McClellan Air Force Base 
Norton Air Force Base 
Oakland Military Complex 





Sierra Army Depot 
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station 
Aurora 




Cecil Field Naval Air Station 
Homestead Air Force Base 
Key West Naval Air Station 
Orlando 
Pensacola 
Barbers Point Naval Air Station 
Chanute Air Force Base 
Fort Sheridan 
Glenview 
Savanna Army Depot 
County 
Juneau Borough 










































1 995 AK 
1 995 AK 
1 995 AL 
1 995 AR 
1 991 AR 
1 991 AZ 
1 993 CA 
1 991 CA 
1 993 CA 
1 991 CA 
1 988 CA 
1 991 CA 
1 993 CA 
1 993 CA 
1 988 CA 
1 995 CA 
1 988 CA 
1 993 CA 
1 995 CA 
1 993 CA 
1 991 CA 
1 993 CA 
1 988 CA 
1 995 CA 
1 991 CA 
1 995 co 
1 991 co 
1 988 co 
1 995 CT 
1 995 CT 
1 993 FL 
1 993 FL 
1 995 FL 
1 993 FL 
1 993 FL 
1 993 HI  
1 988 IL 
1 988 IL 
1 993 IL 
1 995 IL 
First 
Installation/City County BRAe• State 
Fort Benjamin Harrison Marion 1 991 IN 
Grissom Air Force Base Miami 1 991 IN  
Indianapolis Marion 1 995 IN 
Jefferson Proving Ground Jefferson 1 988 IN  
Lexington Fayette 1 988 KY 
Louisville Jefferson 1 995 KY 
England Air Force Base Rapides 1 991 LA 
Fort Polk Vernon 1 991 LA 
Fort Devens Middlesex 1 991 MA 
Watertown Middlesex 1 988 MA 
Weymouth Norfolk 1 995 MA 
Annapolis Anne Arundel 1 995 MD 
Baltimore Baltimore (Independent City) 1 995 MD 
Fort Ritchie Washington 1 995 MD 
Loring Air Force Base Aroostook 1 991 ME 
Detroit Macomb 1 993 Ml 
K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base Marquette 1 993 Ml 
Warren Macomb 1 995 Ml 
Wurtsmith Air Force Base losco 1 991 Ml 
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station Cass 1 991 MO 
St. Louis St. Louis (Independent City) 1 995 MO 
Pease Air Guard Station Rockingham 1 988 N H  
Bayonne Hudson 1 995 NJ 
Fort Dix Burlington 1 988 NJ 
Fort Monmouth Monmouth 1 993 NJ 
Trenton Mercer 1 993 NJ 
Bethpage Nassau 1 995 NY 
Fort Totten Queens 1 995 NY 
Griffiss Air Force Base Oneida 1 993 NY 
New York Richmond 1 993 NY 
Plattsburgh Air Force Base Clinton 1 993 NY 
Senaca Army Depot (Romulus) Seneca 1 995 NY 
Kettering Montgomery 1 993 OH 
Newark Licking 1 993 OH 
Rickenbacker Air Force Base Franklin 1 991 OH 
Kelly Support Facility Westmoreland 1 995 PA 
Letterkenny Army Depot Franklin 1 995 PA 
Philadelphia Military Complex Philadelphia 1 991 PA 
Warminster Bucks 1 995 PA 
Charleston Charleston 1 993 sc 
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base Horry 1 991 sc 
Memphis Shelby 1 995 TN 
Millington Shelby 1 993 TN 
Bergstrom Air Force Base Travis 1 991 TX 
Carswell Air Force Base Tarrant 1 991 TX 
Chase Field Naval Air Station Bee 1 991 TX 
Dallas Dallas 1 993 TX 
Kelly Air Force Base Bexar 1 995 TX 
Red River Army Depot Bowie 1 995 TX 
Reese Air Force Base Lubbock 1 995 TX 
Ogden Weber 1 995 UT 
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Installation/City 








Alexandria (Independent City) 
Nottoway 





1 993 UT 
1 988 VA 
1 995 VA 
1 993 VA 
1 993 VA 
1 988 WA 
• In a few cases bases were effected by more than one BRAC. In these instances, the date 
reflects the first BRAC to impact the base. 
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Air Force Base 
Air Force Station 
Air Guard Base 
Air Reserve Base 
Full Text 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
Base Realignment and Closure 
Congressional Budget Office 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Cost of Base Realignment Action 
Congressional Research Service 
Department of Defense 
Department of Energy 
Department of Labor 
Economic Development Administration 
Energy Information Administration 
Federal Aviation Administration 
General Accounting Office 
Kilowatt Hour 
Logistics Management Institute 
Marine Corps Air Station 
Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Naval Air Station 
Office of Economic Adjustment 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Quadrennial Defense Review 
Regional Economic Information System 






u.s .c .  
USDC 
Full Text 
Reserve Officer Training Corps 
Secretary of the Air Force 
State Energy Price and Expenditure Report 
United States Code 
United States Department of Commerce 
141  
Vita 
Patrick Pappert was born in Lincoln, Nebraska on November 1 7 , 1 963 . He 
attended schools in the public systems of Tacoma, Washington, where he 
graduated from Clover Park High School in June, 1 982. Upon graduation, he 
entered the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. In 
May, 1 986 he received his Bachelor of Science in General Studies and was 
commissioned a regular officer in the United States Air Force. He subsequently 
earned a Master of Business Administration in Aviation Management from 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautica l University (1 989) , a second Bachelors of Science 
degree in Accounting from Roll ins College {1 991 ) ,  and a Master of Science in 
Cost Analysis from the Air Force Institute of Technology (1 992) . He entered the 
Doctor of Philosophy program in Economics at the University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville in August of 1 997, officia lly receiving the Doctoral degree in December 
2001 . 
Patrick has been on continuous active duty with the Air Force s ince his 
commissioning in 1 986. He has mastered a variety of specialties in the financial 
management career field, to include base level internal auditing, weapons 
system cost analysis, and command level flying operations and training budget 
1 42 
and resource management. Presently, he serves as the faculty economics 
expert for the Department of Defense Professional Mil itary Comptroller School, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama . The school is responsible for conducting a 
six week residence course that provides mid- to senior-level DoD personnel 
financial  management instruction and exposure to contemporary issues facing 
defense resource managers. 
Patrick received the Outstanding Accounting Student award from Rollins College 
in 1 991 . He a lso holds a number of professional designations, to include 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) ,  Certified Internal Auditor (C IA), Certified 
Management Accountant (CMA), and Certified in Financial Management (CFM) .  
He  has been a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors and the Institute of 
Management Accountants since 1 990. 
1 43 
